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Start-Up Nanochip Shuts Down

According to The Wall Street Journal Venture Capital Dispath blog, Nanochip shut its doors in May 2009 and is currently looking for a buyer for its intellectual property.

Nanochip had raised $47.4 million in venture capital from investors including JK&B Capital, Intel Capital and Merrill Lynch. New Enterprise Associates also held a stake, but the firm had not invested in Nanochip since the company’s 2004 Series B round.

In September 2008, the company set out to raise the $70 million it would need to finish development of its initial chips and bring them into production. In October 2008, the company decided to drop this goal and soon began dismissing employees as it searched for a buyer.

Nanochip has had interested buyers for its intellectual property but hasn’t had a buyer yet. Its other assets have already been sold.

Nanochip is a maker of memory circuits. The company's technology is an alternative to NAND flash memory. The company had a goal of building memory chips that are 15 times as dense as flash and better functioning.

The company’s memory chips are built with atomic force probe tips that write, read, and record bits of storage onto a medium.

Source.

Filed under  //   Intel Capital   JK&B Capital   Merrill Lynch   Nanochip  

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The Future of Oil: Q&A with Francisco Blanch

From FT.com

Crude oil prices have drifted below $50 a barrel this year as the global recession has dented energy demand in the world’s biggest importers. As stockpiles build up, producers have cut capital expenditure on exploration and new production facilities.

But this could be sowing the seeds of the next bubble, some analysts say. Any failure to gear up output to meet the needs of a recovering economy, could create a gap between supply and demand similar to that which drove crude prices to $150 less than a year ago.

Francisco Blanch, head of global commodities research at Banc of America Securities-Merrill Lynch, answers readers’ questions on the impact of recession and recovery on oil prices.

Where will we see the increasing utilisation of alternative energy sources (such as electric powered cars) bring the price of oil to a permanent low, or will the continuous drainage of oil to a point where the resource is fast running out keep prices elevated?

This is the trillion dollar question. In my opinion, $50/bbl oil is not high enough to encourage a massive shift out of oil towards alternative energy. As an example, most biofuels plants around the world will lose money with oil prices below $60/bbl, while wind farms do not really make much sense in a low oil price world.

Will policymakers focus on energy efficiency when oil is a cheaper alternative and other political issues are more pressing?

We believe that continued upward pressure on energy prices will be needed to focus policy on energy efficiency. Limited spare capacity, strong underlying trend demand and the need for efficiency improvements all suggest that energy prices may have to increase again in the coming years relative to other prices in the economy. Our long-term WTI crude oil price forecast is $72/bbl in real terms.

In the midst of a global recession (depression?) with oil demand so low, one would expect prices to be low and remain low, and yet there still seems to be massive volatility in the price on a day to day and week to week basis. Why is this?

Fundamentally, price volatility in the commodity markets is linked to inventories. Commodity stocks, in effect, serve as a cushion to adjust supply and demand shocks in the physical market. In commodities such as oil and natural gas, where there storage constraints are a feature of the physical market, high levels of inventories can result in high levels of volatility.

Thus, we should not be surprised that the massive demand shock resulting from the global economic meltdown has pushed up oil price volatility. Similarly, low inventory levels can also drive volatility up in oil markets, as we saw last summer.

Technically, commodity price volatility is linked to volatility in other markets including equities, rates, credit or FX. I like to say that volatility is contagious. What will happen to oil price volatility going forward? In the second half of this year, we believe that the oil market will tighten and move from a very large surplus into a deficit, as demand stabilises and Opec maintains low output levels.

A tighter balance should mean that oil inventories could start drawing down in the coming months towards their 10 year average. In turn, a shift towards average inventory levels could help bring oil price volatility lower.

In 10 months, oil prices have decreased around 65 per cent. Do you see the recession as the one and only reason for this decrease?

Yes, we believe supply and demand fundamentals, and changes in the money supply and the velocity of money have been the key drivers of oil prices in the last five years. Industrial production across a broad range of developed and emerging economies came down very sharply in the fourth quarter last year and first quarter of 2009.

In the case of Japan, industrial output is now at the same level it was back in 1983, while German and American industrial activity has taken a step back of almost 10 years. These dramatic swings in economic activity are enough, in my judgement, to create such a large swing in prices.

Opec decided at its last meeting not to reduce output. After this decision, and coupled with poor demand and a move away from carbon fuels, can we seriously expect prices of $150+ ever again?

My simple answer to your question is yes, but a more important question perhaps is when. Due to their high exposure to the business cycle, oil prices have been seriously beaten by the current crises and are unlikely to stage a recovery until there are convincing signs that the global economy has turned the corner.

By then, another set of consecutive years of underinvestment in production capacity, coupled with a massive government debt overhang, will end up exacerbating the very same problems that created the most recent spike in energy prices, in my opinion. This situation could develop as soon as 2011 or 2012 and as late as 2015.

Another important factor that could push oil prices to $150/bbl in two to three years could be the tsunami of monetary and fiscal policy measures aiming to offset the recent private sector credit contraction. In our view, it is still uncertain how governments will be able to service the increased debt. In a world of fiat currencies and large government debts, higher inflation is not an unlikely scenario and a run-up in nominal commodity prices could develop.

In addition, with emerging markets poised to grow at a faster rate than OECD economies in the next decade and limited spare productive capacity, commodity markets could be among the first to experience inflationary pressures.

Is for example extraction of oil from the Alberta tar sands developments operationally economic at $50/barrel? What oil price is required to sanction capital expenditure on further tar sands projects?

It is important to differentiate between operational costs to maintain existing facilities and operational and incentive prices for new investments in productive capacity.

The current price level of $50/bbl will keep the existing tar sands projects in Alberta operational, but will not encourage new investment into the sector. As recently as 2008, our equity analysts estimated that new tar sands projects would only make sense financially at $90/bbl. Fortunately, improved labour productivity, lower steel and component pricing, and an end to the cost inflation environment of the 2006-2008 oil sands boom period are bringing incentive prices lower.

For oil sands projects, our equity analysts estimate that a cost reduction of 25 per cent in new projects is achievable over the next few years. If achieved, this could drive the required oil price to generate acceptable returns from $90/bbl back down to the $70-75/bbl range.

Our calculations suggest that the oil industry’s marginal source of supply will fall to US$70-75/bbl. However, we still expect to see continued price volatility around marginal costs particularly in periods of significant positive or negative divergence from trend levels of growth.

How much of the $150 per barrel oil do you feel was the result of institutional investors buying oil futures instead of, for example, asset backed securities as the crisis unfolded? If the impact of such speculation was significant then do you believe that speculators will continue to play a large role in a potential future oil bubble? Or have we learned our lessons for now?

The influx of investment in commodities sparked an intense and politically charged debate last year on whether speculation somehow caused the price of commodities to become disconnected from the fundamentals of supply and demand. Having analysed the available data in detail, we believe there is simply no evidence for that assertion.

Instead, we can find a clear link from sharp changes in monetary policy to abrupt commodity price movements. Looking back thirty years, our analysis concludes that a 1 per cent reduction in real interest rates results in a 17.5 per cent increase in spot commodity prices 10 months later. Our estimate thus suggests that loose monetary policy played a much more important role than speculators in the commodity price rally in the first half of 2008.

If the prospect of a future price bubble is so obvious why are not speculators already driving up the price, which in turn would encourage investment in oil exploration, extraction and refining?

The short answer is that long-dated oil prices are already on the rise. ICE Brent crude oil contracts for delivery in December 2017 closed last Friday at $78.71/bbl, a 60 per cent premium to current spot prices. The oil futures curve is currently pricing in nominal price appreciation of around 6 per cent per annum for the next 8 years.

I would like to clarify, however, that long-dated oil prices are not just driven by ”speculators”. Key participants in the oil markets include consumers, refiners, producers, inflation hedgers and speculators, defined here as investors that have the ability to go long or short any given contract to take advantage of market conditions). At the moment, a number of consumers have re-entered the market to take advantage of relatively low prices to hedge forward consumption.

Is it possible for the world to exceed more than 90 million barrels of oil production per day? If not, what alternatives is Merrill Lynch investing in to fill the demand gap of 10, 15, 20 years from now?

Perhaps 90 million barrels a day is a reachable target, but the chance of world oil production ever exceeding 95 million barrels a day is very low, in my view. On our estimates, if global GDP grows by 3.6 per cent every year over the next decade, annual energy demand will increase by 4 million b/d of energy in oil equivalent terms.

For oil, this figure could mean an annual net increase in global demand of 1 million b/d. Given the natural limits to supply, policymakers will have to shift their attention to energy efficiency. I can not really comment on what Merrill Lynch is investing, but I certainly see the need to increase global energy supply by 1.7 per cent per annum and global energy efficiency by 1.8 per cent per annum every year over the next decade.

What does that mean for investors? I think sectors such as energy productivity, alternative fuels, renewable electricity generation, but also conventional fuels such as coal or natural gas, will all provide very good opportunities over the next decade as we struggle to fill the ”demand gap” left by oil.

Is the persistent contango structure of the future oil market a sign of increasing dislocations in the oil market or is it just the result of normal market expectations? When do you think the curve will go back to its prevailing backwardation structure?

The persistent contango structure is primarily a function of the extremely high level of inventories, and the ongoing supply/demand imbalance. Keep in mind, however, that the second quarter of the year is the seasonally low point in demand. Thus, we should see a sequential improvement in global oil demand based both on seasonal factors as well as on a slight improvement in underlying economic demand.

In my opinion, with the oil market turning more balanced and Opec keeping over 3.5 million b/d off the market, inventories are heading for a draw in the second half of 2009. Thus, we believe that oil prices will likely continue to strengthen in the next six months.

However, long-dated prices are unlikely to follow suit, as the demand recovery will likely be very shallow in 2010. In a market with abundant spare capacity and a tightening balance, the pronounced crude contango should lead to a flatter curve or even to backwardation. Thus, we believe that the term structure of WTI crude oil prices will continue to flatten from here.

Given that some oil resources are uneconomic to exploit at current prices, what price does oil need to reach for post recession demand to be met?

We believe that two forces will need to be at work over the next decade to prevent further oil price spikes: (1) increased investment into the oil sector and (2) increased energy efficiency and substitution. Thus, oil prices need to be high enough to encourage a relatively slow oil demand growth path going forward and oil prices need to be high enough to encourage investment in marginal sources of supply, which we believe are Canadian oil sands and biofuels.

Keep in mind that commodity production utilisation rates are still high compared to other sectors, so any rebound in economic activity will likely have an impact on commodity prices before it hits other parts of the economy.

Low spare capacity availability on a relative basis, strong underlying trend demand and the need for energy efficiency all suggest that WTI crude oil prices may have to average $72/bbl in the long-term in real terms. In turn, a high oil price will keep energy’s share of global GDP above historical averages.

Did Peak Oil get it wrong and now it’s Peak Demand?

No doubt, global industrial production and economic activity has fallen sharply, with OECD economies contracting at an unprecedented rate in recent quarters. However, this extraordinary ”demand vacuum” created by the collapse of the credit bubble could be filled up quickly by demand for durables in Emerging Markets, in our opinion. We estimate that about 1.7 billion consumers sit on an annual GDP per head of $5,000 to $20,000, mostly in Emerging Markets and mostly unlevered.

This bracket of income is a sweet spot for the consumption of durable goods and for taking on leverage, as appetite for washing machines, freezers or cars rises rapidly when per capita income hits $5,000. As a reference point, Americans had a real GDP per capita of $12,000 in 1980 as the multi-decade long credit bubble began, while Portugal did not cross the GDP per capita mark of $10,000 until 1990.

Thus, as a higher consumption of durables comes with a substantial increase in energy use, supply constraints could soon resurface. As a reference point, global energy demand in oil equivalent terms increased by 6 million b/d in 2007. For China, India and other Emerging Markets to drive and fly, we need all the oil we can get, or a viable alternative to the existing transportation technology.

Given that the fall of oil prices have revealed that countries like Russia and Venezuela have failed to diversify their economies outside of commodities; do you see any oil producing economies making progress to diversify their economy in this climate?

Broadly speaking, I think commodity producers have been more cautious with their spending in the past business cycle than during the oil and commodity boom of the 1970s. In Latin America, Mexico, Brazil or Chile are good examples of oil price hedging, economic diversification, and precautionary savings ahead of the commodity price downturn.

In the Middle East, emerging trading centres in the United Arab Emirates or Qatar could well gain increasing traction in sectors such as finance with global taxation on the rise, partly thanks to heavy investment in infrastructure. Similarly, a broad range of commodity producers sit on large Sovereign Wealth Funds that should allow them to endure the oil price downturn.

There is a long-lasting dispute on the impact of speculation on oil prices. Has the relation between fundamental (physical) and financial (speculative) factors changed after the financial crisis, and are oil bourses (ICE, Nymex) gaining influence compared to OTC deals?

In our view, a global misallocation of capital sits at the heart of the current economic crisis. In simple terms, capital markets failed in recent years and channelled too much money into real estate, too little into energy. Having analysed the available data in detail a few months ago, we found no link between speculative activity and systematic price increases in commodity markets.

As part of a general growth in derivatives across all asset classes trading volumes and open interest in commodity derivatives surely increased, but only some commodities experienced significant price swings in the last two years. What has changed after the credit crisis?

Naturally, listed products are gaining ground across all asset classes, not just commodities, as regulators and market participants press for greater transparency and lower credit risk. Still, activity in the over-the-counter market continues unabated because it offers a customized angle that listed markets can’t provide. Having said that, market participants will now choose to clear trades on the exchange to limit counterparty credit risk, when possible.

Opec regularly states that they require an oil price around 70$/bbl to sustain projects. Where do you see Opec production cost at the moment and do you have an estimate of how many projects have already been postponed or cancelled?

Opec production cutbacks have been very significant. From a peak of 30.3 million b/d in July last year, Opec-11 crude oil production has come down to about 26 million b/d, helping create a floor to global crude oil prices. However, actual oil production costs for most Opec members are substantially lower than $70/bbl, perhaps as low as $10-20/bbl.

Similarly, social oil costs for Opec, or the oil price required to balance the member governments’ budgets, differ by country. For Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar or the Emirates, we estimate that $50/bbl would suffice to roughly bring government budgets into balance, while members such as Iran or Venezuela probably require higher prices of $70/bbl to break even. Then again, we are talking about social costs, not production costs or incentive prices for new supply.

Having said that, new investments in Canadian oil sands and biofuels production require a $70/bbl price tag, but these projects sit mostly outside Opec. So far, over half of all planned oil sands-related projects in Canada have been delayed or cancelled, while many biofuels producers have cut back on their investment plans.

With collapsing global oil prices and the rapidly increasing cost of funding, we expect delays on expensive development projects like Canadian oil sands to continue. Within Opec, we have also seen significant cutbacks in capital expenditures, as financial resources are being diverted to other sectors of the economy.

Currently there is well over 100 million bbls of crude and 25 millions barrels of products in floating storage. This, combined with record shore stocks will surely provide a buffer until production increases to meet any increase in demand and therefore prevent a price bubble?

I agree that there are very low chances of an oil price spike in the next 12 to 18 months, but I also believe the market could start to tighten again in 2011. Remember that 125 million barrels in floating storage is only 1.5 days of global oil demand, so this cushion is not as large as it seems if economic activity ticks up.

However, given the shallow demand recovery ahead, the high inventory levels, and the increased spare capacity in refining and crude oil supply within Opec, I do not see much upside to oil prices until the end of next year.

Our current forecast for WTI crude oil prices in 2010 is $62/bbl. Beyond next year, the limited growth prospects in rich OECD economies stand in stark contrast to the middle income emerging economies.

As I have pointed out in another question, we estimate that 1.7 billion consumers sit on annual GDP per head of $5k to $20k, a sweet spot for the consumption of durables and for taking on leverage. Thus, the medium-term energy demand prospects are a lot brighter as EM economies start to recover.

Source.

Filed under  //   Alternative Energy   Backwardation   China   Contango   Emerging Markets   Francisco Blanch   India   Latin America   Merrill Lynch   Oil   Oil Futures   OPEC   Qatar   Russia   United Arab Emirates   Venezuela  

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Goldman Sachs Back in the Black

If the Wall Street investment bank was supposedly trampled by the panic of 2008, someone forgot to tell Goldman Sachs. The credit crisis killed off Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and ended Merrill Lynch’s independence. Goldman, the last of its peers to go public, has recovered from its fourth-quarter loss to make $1.8bn in the first three months of the year, more than double analysts’ estimates.

And that’s despite some poor numbers in some of its core businesses: incentive fees on hedge funds were virtually non-existent, principal investments recorded a $1.4bn net loss and depressed equity and mergers and acquisitions markets hit investment banking fees and prime brokerage revenue.

In truth, it’s hard not to gander at Goldman’s earnings and conclude the firm, which along with rival Morgan Stanley sought refuge by becoming a bank holding company, is trying to prove the investment bank model it appeared to have dropped is still alive and kicking. For starters, the firm’s black box trading operations provided most of the juice. Second, in an act that seems like biting its thumb to Congress, Goldman set aside more revenue to pay staff, both as a percentage of revenue and on an absolute basis, than last year.

And Goldman executives also appear to have called a halt to shrinking the group’s balance sheet. Sure, assets only rose by 5% since last quarter to $925bn, but that’s a stark change to the deleveraging that has beset the financial sector for a year or more.

Those are some punchy tactics for a firm hoping to convince the Treasury to allow it to pay back the $10bn of taxpayer-funded capital foisted upon it last autumn. But Goldman appears to have the numbers to back it up and to persuade shareholders to stump up for its $5bn stock sale. If Goldman is any evidence, Wall Street isn’t in its coffin just yet.

Source.

Filed under  //   Bear Stearns   Goldman Sachs Group   Hedge Funds   Lehman Brothers   Merrill Lynch   Wall Street  

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Don't Leave Home Without It

Despite a fabled brand name and an affluent, free-spending clientele that is the envy of the charge-and credit-card business, American Express has gotten caught in the same downward vortex as the rest of global financial industry.

Indeed, its once-highflying stock crashed to under 10 in early March 2009 from more than 50 last spring, before rebounding to 18.83 on Aparil 9, 2009. Negatives seem to abound. A poor economy caused card usage, both business and personal, to slow, and in some categories, to drop.

Amex credit-card delinquencies and charge-offs hurtled to higher levels both in the second half of 2008 and the first two months of this year. And an ill-fated company decision to push credit cards on folks with multiple mortgages resulted in Amex dramatically increasing its exposure to customers in the epicenter of the home-price collapse in California and Florida.

Not even American Express (ticker: AXP) thinks things will improve much for at least the next three quarters, or so Amex Chairman and CEO Kenneth Chenault said in recent shareholder communications; company officials were unavailable to comment to Barron's, since Amex is in a "quiet period" before releasing first-quarter earnings.

Yet American Express' outlook isn't nearly as hopeless as is commonly thought on Wall Street. For one thing, unlike its peers, the company gets the bulk of its revenue and earnings from fee income generated by transaction volume, not the extension of credit. This is because charge cards, which are supposed to be paid off monthly, make up a substantial share of American Express' volume. AmEx therefore has substantially less credit risk.

Likewise, the company has addressed its credit-card mistakes with some vigor since the fall, and should be able to stem the surge in defaults in the next couple of quarters. Not least, with the help of various government bailout programs, AmEx seems to have ample liquidity to ride out the current economic downturn without having to dilute shareholders by selling stock.

To be sure, plenty of uncertainties remain for the New York-based company. The outlook for home prices and unemployment levels weighs heavily on any credit-card lender like AmEx, and remains a wild card in a weakening economy. As a result, analysts' estimates for AmEx are all over the place.

Consensus forecasts for this year vary from a profit of $1.65 a share to a loss of $1.11, with the average of 19 estimates coming in at 55 cents. Next year has spawned even wilder inconsistencies in earnings forecasts. The average forecast of $1.16 includes high and low estimates of $2.79 and negative 27 cents.

Yet William Ryan of the financial-industry research boutique Portales Partners recently issued a Buy on the stock at 15, after rating AmEx a Hold since it traded above 60 in July 2007. He reasoned that even with higher credit-card charge-offs coming in the near term, the stock is a great buy in the longer term.

"Look, we never know until after the fact when the inflection point comes, as low valuation finally trumps near-term fundamentals," Ryan says. "Most people are going to miss the party if they wait for the turn in credit losses."

Ryan and Portales refrain from giving out target prices. But an analyst at a large, low-profile hedge fund that has been loading up on American Express wasn't so constrained. "I think AmEx is at least a double over the next year or two," he avers.

Much of Amex's resilence to tough times comes from a business model that emphasizes lower-risk transaction-fee volume rather than lending, according to Fox-Pitt Kelton analyst Bill Carcache. Last year, for example, AmEx cardholders used their charge and credit cards to buy $683 billion worth of goods and services, a volume that dwarfed that of their competitors.

Chief among the transaction fees generated by this prodigious volume is the industry-high 2.5% fee that AmEx typically charges merchants for access to AmEx's big-spending cardholder population.

AmEx gets to keep the bulk of this fee income, since unlike most card sponsors, the company runs a closed-loop network in which it issues and markets cards, handles all transaction processing and even "acquires" and directly pays off all its merchants around the globe. Most bank issuers have to share their merchant fees with the likes of Visa (V), MasterCard (MA) and First Data.

Credit risk from customers stiffing credit-card companies looms smaller at AmEx. It had extended $72 billion to cardholders as of year-end 2008, less than half the total in cardholder receivables carried by competitors Citigroup (C), Bank of America (BAC) and JPMorgan Chase (JPM).

Much of the investor concern over AmEx arises from the sudden surge in delinquencies and, even more damaging, loan charge-offs in excess of the company's competitors. This wasn't supposed to happen at American Express, given the company's more affluent customer base.

Yet after lagging behind industry averages for most of 2008, charge-offs at AmEx began to skyrocket in the fourth quarter, according to closely watched monthly performance data taken from the company's major credit-card-receivables securitization. By February of this year, charge-offs in the AmEx trust had vaulted to 9.31%, far above the industry's monthly average of 7.76%.

The jump in AmEx loan defaults, however, may not be as telling as it first appears. The rates of late have been pushed higher by a wicked denominator effect, as management began reducing outstanding credit to U.S. consumers in the second half of last year by cutting credit lines and raising interest rates and fees on accounts. The company even offered some account holders with outstanding balances a $300 gift card in exchange for closing the accounts.

The efforts earned AmEx some bad press for its hard-nosed tactics but enabled the company to reduce its U.S. credit-card receivables total (the denominator of the charge-off data) to $57.8 billion at the end of February from $65.9 billion at year-end 2007. This also magnifies the default rate vis-á-vis peers who were less aggressive in paring back their credit exposures.

Other factors also may work to blunt the recent vertiginous rise in AmEx's U.S. charge-offs. After closely examining the February trust data, Portales' Bill Ryan sees some favorable developments. While charge-offs surged in the month, loan delinquencies, the raw material for future charge-offs or defaults, were far better-behaved.

Total delinquencies in the trust rose just 12 basis points, 12 hundredths of a percentage point, to 5.40% of total U.S. credit-card receivables or borrowing, compared with a sequential monthly jump of 42 basis points in January. But even more telling, according to Ryan, was the fact that in February, early-stage (31-to-60-day) delinquencies actually dropped from the month before by nine basis points, to 1.38%, while mid-stage (61-to-90-day) delinquencies rose but five basis points, to 1.23%.

Early-stage delinquencies normally drop some in February, for the simple reason that many cardholders labor hard to pay down swollen balances quickly from the holiday season. But the drop this February was larger than usual.

As a student of the credit cycle, Ryan thinks that yet another factor may soon steady AmEx's fortunes. AmEx currently is paying the price for its promiscuous extension of credit and bad underwriting practices of recent years that saw its U.S. card-lending jump from $39.9 billion at the end of 2004 to the aforementioned peak of $65.9 billion at the end of 2007.

AmEx was looking for love in all the wrong places, oblivious as were most Americans of the approaching financial and economic tsunami.

Yet, says Ryan, the losses AmEx is now suffering from bad underwriting decisions tend to be short-lived and violent, compared with losses that creditors suffer from economic weakness, with its attendant rise in unemployment and drop in consumer spending.

"I'm not saying that credit losses at AmEx won't continue to rise some in the months ahead, but the deterioration in charge-offs compared to that of its peers will be tempered somewhat as the underwriting mistakes are quickly washed through AmEx's system," says Ryan.

Liquidity has been yet another concern of investors, about AmEx specifically and the financial industry in general. Beaten-up stock prices in the sector make stock offerings punishingly dilutive to current stockholders. Even more damaging has been the freezing-up of the all-important asset-backed securitization market, which allowed lenders like AmEx to bundle vast hunks of their credit-card receivables and sell them off to investors in the form of bonds.

At the end of last year, such securitizations accounted for some $29 billion of the $72 billion in credit that AmEx had extended to cardholders in both the U.S. and abroad.

After the collapse of global credit markets following the Lehman bankruptcy last September, AmEx, like other U.S. financial institutions, has made ample use of the panoply of U.S. government liquidity and credit facilities to fill in the financing breach. It received an injection of $3.4 billion under the now somewhat notorious Troubled Asset Relief Program.

AmEx also availed itself of $5.9 billion in borrowings under the government-guaranteed Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program. In addition, AmEx has plenty of unused credit capacity, including $7.4 billion under the TLGP, $8.7 billion under its bank facilities and a $5 billion credit conduit that won't expire for several months, according to a recent report by JPMorgan analyst Andrew Wessel.

All of this has left AmEx with about $25 billion in cash and readily marketable securities, which more than covers its liquidity needs for the next 12 months. They include some $20 billion in long-term debt and asset-based-securitization maturities.

American Express seems to have ample capacity to weather the current financial storm and survive comfortably until charge-offs abate and the all-clear sign is posted for the economy. Among other things, the company recently exhibited its confidence by affirming its current dividend-payout level, which costs it some $200 million a quarter.

And as AmEx recently observed on its Website, its ratio of tangible common equity to risk-weighted assets was 8.5% at year end, "higher than that of most bank holding companies, and all our regulatory ratios are comfortably above the 'well-capitalized' thresholds."

The government facilties eventually will expire. Yet AmEx is hard at work developing other funding sources should its access to traditional capital markets remain difficult. It is now availing itself of retail certificates of deposit pushed by traditional brokerage houses like Merrill Lynch as an investment alternative to high-net worth customers. This program has yielded some $8.8 billion in funding since last fall.

The company also plans to roll out a new program this quarter designed to attract direct deposits to American Express using direct mail, the Internet and other forms of advertising. With the cachet of the American Express name, the company should have no trouble using these channels to replace the securitization market as a source of cheap funding.

Given the necessity of carrying a larger capital base even after the economy improves, AmEx said in its annual report that in the future it expects to deliver a return on equity of more than 20%, instead of meeting its old goal of better-than-33% ROE. Of course, 20% is a return that most companies would die for.

Investors could do a lot worse than shares of American Express, especially at current price levels, even if it no longer aspires to be the fastest car on the track.

Source.

Filed under  //   American Express   Bank of America   Bill Carcache   Citigroup   First Data   Fox-Pitt Kelton   JPMorgan Chase   Kenneth Chenault   MasterCard   Merrill Lynch   Portales Partners   Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program   Troubled Asset Relief Program   Visa   William Ryan  

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The John Thain Epic: The Fall Guy

John Thain is giving us a tour of what is soon to become America’s most infamous office, with its $87,000 rug, $68,000 sideboard, $28,000 curtains, all part of a $1.2m redecoration scheme. This was early December 2008, a little under two months before Thain would be fired in the same room by his new boss, Ken Lewis, chief executive of Bank of ­America.

For now, before a price tag had been placed on every item in his office, the 53-year-old chief executive of Merrill Lynch was in high spirits. The worst year on Wall Street in nearly a century was coming to an end, and Thain could rightfully claim to have saved his bank from ruin.

Over a weekend in mid-September, as Lehman Brothers collapsed into bankruptcy, Thain pulled off a coup: he persuaded BofA, one of the few financial giants in the US that didn’t need government money to survive, to pay $29 per share for his own firm, even though Merrill was days away from following Lehman into bankruptcy.

Thain had taken over as Merrill chief executive nine months before that weekend deal. Now, he appeared to be one of the few Wall Street leaders who grasped the enormity of the credit crisis. Thanks to his ­analytical approach to the marketplace, it seemed, ­Merrill shareholders could look forward to a stake in Bank of America.

“I have received thousands of e-mails saying, "Thank you for ­saving our company." Thain has said. And yet he admitted that the decision to sell Merrill Lynch, a 94-year-old institution that was always “bullish on America”, had been painful. “This was a great job. This was a great franchise. Emotionally, it was a huge responsibility.”

What was his personal reaction? “You can’t live through an event like this and not be changed,” he said. Before Merrill, Thain had gone from one success to another. He began his career at Goldman Sachs, where he rose swiftly through the ranks, then moved to the New York Stock Exchange, where he repositioned an outmoded ­institution for global growth.

He had been hired by Merrill to save the company from the mountain of subprime-­mortgage-related assets stockpiled by his predecessor, Stan O’Neal. But instead of saving the firm, he sold it to BofA. Or, from another perspective, he saved the firm by selling it.

But as the events of the next two months would show, despite what he told us that day, Thain had not been changed by his short and tumultuous tenure at Merrill. His 13 months at its helm and three weeks at BofA were to expose some blind spots. He appeared to be a man in a bubble, not good at listening to advice, and worse still at detecting changes of tone when it came to the public’s tolerance for corporate excess.

Even as he mused with us over the highlights of the previous year, the ground beneath him was eroding. Flashes of arrogance and misjudgment, not to mention the insubordination of his top lieutenants from Merrill Lynch, were becoming apparent to his new bosses at BofA, who were themselves keenly aware that the old Masters of the Universe banking model was done for. John Thain’s world had changed, even if he hadn’t.

John Alexander Thain was born in Antioch, ­Illinois, the son of a doctor. He excelled at ­Antioch Community High School, captained the wrestling team and served as the school’s valedictorian upon graduation.

The young man with ramrod posture and a head of thick, dark hair moved east at 18 to study electrical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology before earning a masters in ­business administration at Harvard. Upon graduation in 1979, he joined Goldman Sachs, working in corporate finance, then investment banking.

Mr Thain's rise at Goldman accelerated when he was selected to help launch a mortgage-backed securities division, reporting to Jon ­Corzine, who was then partner in charge of ­government, mortgage and money markets trading at Goldman’s fixed income group. Jon Corzine is currently the Governor of New Jersey. He was seriously injured in an automobile accident on April 12, 2007.

By 1990, Thain had risen to treasurer at Goldman and four years later, chief financial officer. In 1998, as chief executive, Corzine wanted to end Goldman’s partnership structure and take the firm public. In the internal ­dispute over this and other ­management issues, Thain, now presiding over the bank’s European operations, and several senior Goldman executives ousted ­Corzine, installing investment banker Hank Paulson as co-chief executive.

On the question of going public, Thain and his co-conspirators were on the wrong side of history: the firm’s initial public offering in 1999 ­enabled it to thrive over the next decade.

Even at Goldman Sachs, with a corporate culture of weeding out ­aging partners and promoting devotion to the firm over loyalty to individuals, Thain’s decision to turn on Corzine shocked many of his colleagues, enhancing a reputation for ruthlessness. A senior New York Fed official who worked with him in 1998, on the rescue of the failed hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management, describes Thain at that time as “a stone-cold killer”.

In 2003, Thain left Goldman to become chief executive of the New York Stock Exchange. His predecessor, Richard Grasso, had been ousted following a furore over his $187m pay package, and because he favoured maintaining the NYSE’s antiquated trading system. Thain forced the exchange to embrace electronic trading. His biggest achievement was to do what he’d initially resisted at Goldman and transform the “Big Board” into a public company.

Thain continued the company’s expansion by acquiring Euronext, a pan-European exchange. It successfully positioned the NYSE for global growth, as the results showed: in the two years after it went public, profits rose threefold. Seatholders at the old exchange, the owners of the 1,366 “seats” that confer the right to trade, reaped a bonanza when those seats were converted to shares.

Taking the NYSE public also helped Thain earn some $9m in 2006, a modest amount ­compared with the more than $100m he made over his career at Goldman. But more than the money, the NYSE experience proved that Thain could run a ­company on his own.

By 2007, Thain was anxious for a new challenge. It arrived seven blocks north-west of the NYSE, at the World Financial Centre headquarters of Merrill Lynch, where the investment bank was in the process of imploding. Under the leadership of Stan O’Neal, Merrill had boosted its earnings from $4.4bn in 2004 to $7.5bn in 2006, fuelled in part by the firm’s aggressive position in the market for securities backed by subprime ­mortgages so-called CDOs, collateralised debt obligations. But O’Neal’s profits came in the absence of any meaningful risk controls.

In a quest to keep boosting its income statement, Merrill bought subprime mortgage lender First Franklin in September 2006, at the height of the real estate bubble, for $1.3bn; in October 2007, the bank was forced to write down $8bn in losses on its dodgy assets, wiping out nearly a year’s profits.

O’Neal resigned six days later, and the company’s board launched a hurried search for a replacement. Among the candidates were acting co-chief executive Greg Fleming, who headed Merrill’s investment banking operations, and Larry Fink, chief executive of BlackRock, the massive asset management firm 49 per cent owned by ­Merrill.

According to a person involved in the selection process, Alberto Cribore, the lead director at Merrill, wanted Thain, the “Mr Fix-It” who had turned around the NYSE. The board moved quickly, and in November 2007, Merrill announced that Thain would become its 12th chief executive.

The new leader didn’t come cheap. When Thain joined Merrill in December 2007, he was awarded a signing bonus of $15m and an incentive plan tied closely to the value of Merrill shares, then worth some $68m. What Thain did not receive upon being named chief executive was a crash course in the art of internal company politics.

Merrill Lynch is best known in the US for being the brokerage firm that brought Wall Street to Main Street. After the second world war, the company aggressively courted retail investors across America, building a network of financial advisers that was unparalleled in terms of both assets under management and geographical reach.

Although the company soon expanded into investment banking and trading in the markets on its own account, it remained best known for its “thundering herd” of 16,000 financial advisers. It was also a “family friendly” firm, where sons followed in their fathers’ footsteps and personal loyalty trumped almost every other quality.

By 2002, when O’Neal took charge, Merrill was over-extended. O’Neal fired thousands of employees and campaigned against the “Mother ­Merrill” culture. As a result of O’Neal’s purges, many of the firm’s “culture carriers” departed, often acrimoniously. The talent drain was particularly apparent in 2006 and 2007, when Merrill dug itself into a huge financial hole. The Merrill Lynch that Thain took over in December 2007 was a shadow of its former self.

At first, Thain made the right moves, gathering allies quickly. In ­January 2008, he turned up at a conference of financial advisers in ­Arizona, pressed the flesh and declared his commitment to the thundering herd. ­Fleming, the head of investment banking who had survived the O’Neal era, pledged to help Thain from the start, joining him in an initial round of capital-raising.

Bob McCann, the street-smart leader of the thundering herd, also rallied round the new boss. It was hardly a holy trinity; however, Fleming and McCann weren’t close to each other, and they both kept a watchful eye on their new leader even while pledging loyalty.

Over time, some Merrill executives started to complain among themselves and to outsiders about a perceived arrogance in Thain. Indeed, a cult of personality had sprung up around him during his tenure at the NYSE. Although the Big Board is tiny compared with Merrill, it occupies a disproportionately large share of the national attention when it comes to US financial markets.

Thain’s success there triggered reams of glowing press reviews, including a profile in Institutional Investor magazine titled “The Adventures of SuperThain”. The hype mattered: Thain’s status helped him raise almost $20bn for a firm that had lost all credibility before his arrival. But some colleagues at Merrill felt all this had gone to his head.

Shortly after arriving, Thain hired two of his closest aides from the NYSE, chief financial officer Nelson Chai and com­munications director ­Margaret Tutwiler. Tutwiler’s ­philosophy, ac­­cor­d­ing to those who dealt with her, was to promote Thain as “the public face of Merrill Lynch”. That approach grated on some subordinates, who felt that no matter how hard they worked to turn the firm around, all the glory would accrue to one man.

In a Financial Times December 2008 interview, Thain admitted that he had underestimated the magnitude of the problems Merrill Lynch faced. At the time he joined, he told reporters that he didn’t plan to end the bank’s involvement in the already troubled CDO market, despite the $8bn in write-downs on those securities in the third quarter of 2007.

“I didn’t focus on this when I took over,” he told us. “I didn’t know how much the market was going to deteriorate over the course of the year.” He wasn’t alone. Thain’s generation of Wall Street leaders had never experienced anything akin to what lay before them in 2008.

It was only after the Fed brokered the sale of Bear Stearns, another famed Wall Street investment bank, to JPMorgan Chase in mid-March 2008 that Thain says he became alarmed. And yet, even in April, discussing Merrill’s first-quarter losses in the wake of Bear Stearns’ collapse, Thain told ­analysts he was staying the course. “We’re not pulling back from our fundamental strategy,” he said. “We’re not changing our view.”

Top lieutenants urged him to sell as many of Merrill’s toxic assets as he could, but colleagues remember Thain dismissing suggestions from below with a curt, “No, we’re not going to do that”. Throughout the spring and summer, Thain argued internally and to investors and regulators that Merrill was different from Bear, that the steady stream of fees generated by its thundering herd would protect it.

By early summer, however, with Merrill’s share price continuing to fall, there was no evidence of a turnaround. Despite this, Thain didn’t seem to grasp the gravity of some of his remarks. In a conference call in June 2008, for example, when discussing the possibility of raising capital, he mentioned that ­Merrill might sell its stakes in the Bloomberg publishing group or BlackRock.

Although he had vaguely raised such possibilities before, in the context of the conference call the remark came as a shock to BlackRock’s top executives, including founder Larry Fink. Over the next few weeks, BlackRock’s share price dropped by almost 25 per cent, enraging Fink.

By mid-July, Thain had abandoned the idea of selling BlackRock, but Fink and some of Thain’s top deputies had already begun to question his authority. At one meeting, Thain would insist that the trading desk “lighten up” the balance sheet. But a week later, no action would have been taken. Or Thain would turn down a request to hire a high-profile investment banker, but negotiations with the individual would still take place. ­

Making matters worse were Thain’s own high-profile hires. In the spring of 2008, ­Merrill announced that Tom Montag and Peter Kraus would join from Goldman Sachs. The size of the pair’s pay packages, $39m and $29m respectively, shocked Merrill executives who were preparing for pay cuts.

Merrill’s second quarter was a disaster, encompassing a $9.4bn write-down and a $4.6bn loss. It was obvious that the group would need more capital. Thain sold the bank’s investment in Bloomberg back to New York mayor Michael Bloomberg for $4.3bn, and accelerated an on-again, off-again plan to sell a big chunk of the firm’s CDOs.

On July 29, Merrill announced the sale of $31bn in CDOs to Lone Star Funds for $6.7bn. Just weeks earlier, the CDOs had been valued at $11bn on Merrill’s balance sheet. Merrill provided 75 per cent of the financing to make the deal happen, but it seemed worth it: with the sale, Thain had put Merrill’s problems behind him.

At the same time, the bank raised $8.5bn in new capital. It was a high-wire act that Thain pulled off with aplomb. “The CDOs were the source of the vast majority of losses at Merrill,” Thain told us in December. “There was a sense of relief. We had gotten rid of our most dangerous assets and we had raised capital.”

The relief was shortlived. Come September 2008, the market turned bearish, particularly towards Lehman Brothers, once regarded as the ultimate survivor. Richard Fuld, Lehman’s longtime chief executive, tried to halt the slide in his company’s stock price, announcing plans to put all of Lehman’s bad assets into a separate bank, a feat that would have taken months to pull off.

On the evening of Friday, September 12, 2008, after Lehman’s share price had continued to plunge, federal regulators convened Wall Street’s top bankers at the New York Federal Reserve to discuss the firm’s troubles. It was clear that Lehman had three stark choices: find a partner with which to merge, hope for a bailout, or collapse into bankruptcy.

On Saturday morning, Greg Fleming called his boss at home at around 7am. Given Lehman’s precarious situation, Fleming argued that Thain should start talking to BofA. The investment banking model was changing irrevocably and BofA was the best fit for Merrill: it was not a force in wealth management or international investment banking.

Merrill also ran the risk that BofA might buy Lehman if Thain didn’t act. Initially, Thain was unreceptive, he hadn’t reached one of the pinnacles of Wall Street only to cash in his chips from a position of weakness a few months later. Thain arrived at the New York Fed soon after. Within an hour or two, after New York Fed chief ­Timothy Geithner made it clear that Lehman wouldn’t be rescued, Thain called BofA’s chief executive, Ken Lewis, to ­initiate talks.

Asked whether he was pushed to call Lewis by either Geithner or then Treasury secretary Hank Paulson, the same Paulson he helped install as chief executive of Goldman Sachs a decade earlier, Thain said no. The Fed and Treasury “were initially focused on ­Lehman but grew concerned about us”, Thain said. “They wanted to make sure I was being proactive [but] they didn’t tell me to call Ken Lewis.”

For Lewis, who had climbed to the top of the US banking industry through acquisitions, Merrill was the ultimate prize. A deal could transform Bank of America from the McDonald’s of the industry into a financial services titan that would outstrip in size, know-how and reputation: Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase. Lewis said he’d fly to New York from the bank’s headquarters in Charlotte, North ­Carolina, and the two men would meet at BofA’s corporate apartment in the Time Warner Center at 2.30pm.

It was around lunchtime at the Federal Reserve, where meetings continued to take place. In the early afternoon, Morgan Stanley chief executive John Mack approached Thain. The men agreed to talk that evening. One competitor, spotting Thain and Mack in conversation, said that such a union would be like two drunks trying to prop each other up. Executives at Goldman Sachs also wanted to discuss an investment in Merrill, plus a line of credit.

That afternoon, Thain met Lewis ready to discuss the sale of a minority stake in Merrill Lynch. Lewis said he wanted to buy the entire company.

“I didn’t come here to sell the whole company,” Thain replied. Yet Thain recalls that as he and Lewis talked, the strategic logic behind a full deal became apparent. Bank of America was the dominant retail bank in the US, flush with consumer deposits. It was also a leader in the commercial banking business, where Merrill Lynch was weak.

Meanwhile, ­Merrill’s strongest unit, its 16,000 investment advisers, would fill a gaping hole in BofA’s product offerings. Merrill also wielded tremendous clout in the capital markets, where BofA was just a small player.

“The logic of it made a lot of sense to both of us,” Thain says. And yet he still didn’t like the idea of a deal. That evening, he and his two top Goldman hires, Montag and Kraus, met John Mack to discuss a deal with Morgan Stanley. But according to Merrill executives, by Sunday morning, Thain had dismissed the Morgan Stanley option.

Fleming, who was still pushing for a merger with BofA, was holed up at the offices of Wachtell Lipton, the bank’s law firm. He argued that BofA should move quickly to buy all of Merrill to prevent the events of the coming week from derailing the discussions. He pushed for a sale price in the high 20s or low 30s for Merrill stock, a significant premium over the $17 at which the shares had closed the previous Friday.

At the Fed that morning, Paulson laid it on the line with Thain: ­Merrill’s very existence depended on whether or not he could cut a quick deal. To more than one observer, Thain seemed shaken by the weekend’s events. For the New York Fed official who had described Thain as a “stone-cold killer”, the transformation of the Merrill chief executive over the weekend was remarkable. “He had lost his confidence,” the official said.

By Sunday afternoon, it was apparent that BofA would offer a rich price, $29 a share, to acquire Merrill Lynch. Selling the firm was not what Thain had been hired to do, but at least, given the cataclysmic market conditions, he’d got what seemed to be a good price. At 6pm, he convened a telephone board meeting to go over the details.

At 8pm, he rode up to Wachtell ­Lipton’s offices, on 52nd Street and Sixth ­Avenue, to sign the final agreement. A conference room was stocked with champagne, so that at around 9pm, Thain and Lewis could toast the deal. But both sides kept finding fresh details to iron out. When the two chief executives finally made their toast, around midnight, much of the ­bubbly was warm and flat.

On Monday September 15 2008, after Lehman Brothers had filed for bankruptcy protection, Bank of America announced the acquisition of ­Merrill Lynch in an all-stock transaction worth $50bn. When Thain ­convened a “town hall” meeting that afternoon to discuss the deal with Merrill Lynch employees, whatever misgivings he had about the sale were assuaged by the huge round of applause that greeted him.

Over the next few weeks, as some 200 BofA employees, members of a transition team, flocked to Merrill’s offices, Thain found himself managing a new relationship, with Andrea Smith, the human resources executive dispatched from BofA headquarters to serve as his shadow.

One of the key issues in the acquisition agreement concerned the payment of bonuses. By selling to BofA, Merrill’s executives knew that the days of multi-million-dollar bonus payments would come to an end. As a concession, in a non-public side-agreement, BofA allowed Merrill to pay out bonuses of about $4bn before the deal closed.

Neither Lewis nor Thain realised that this small amendment to the contract would eventually spark a state investigation ­requiring them and others to testify under oath about what they knew about the payments and when they knew it.

Shortly after the deal was announced, Thain made it clear to his future employers that he expected a bonus of $40m for putting Merrill together with BofA. That number came as a shock. In a long conversation, BofA’s chief administrative officer, J. Steele Alphin, urged Thain to revise the number downwards.

Alphin told Thain that BofA didn’t reward bankers simply for getting deals done, but for creating deals that worked over time. If Thain harbored any ambitions to succeed Lewis as chief executive of BofA, Alphin warned, a bonus of that size would undermine him with BofA’s board.

Thain agreed, reducing his bonus request over the course of the next two months. Following the creation of a $700bn government bailout fund for US banks, public disgust with multi-million-dollar bonuses and golden parachutes was more than apparent. In November, top executives at Goldman Sachs were the first to declare that they would not accept bonuses for 2008, even though they made a profit for the year.

Thain ultimately came to an understanding with Lewis that his own bonus would be lower than that of his new boss. Presuming that the BofA chief might get as much as $10m for his stewardship of the bank that year, Thain calculated that he deserved a similar, but slightly smaller sum for himself, especially for steering Merrill clear of the bankruptcy that befell Lehman.

On the morning of December 8, the day that Merrill’s board would meet to sign off on bonuses, the Wall Street Journal published a story indicating that Thain was planning to ask for as much as $10m. That afternoon, Thain recommended that neither he nor his top executives receive bonuses for the year.

The board did agree to $3.6bn in bonuses to be paid out to other ­Merrill Lynch executives. At BofA’s request, most of the money would be paid out in cash later in the month, before the deal closed. The early payment would actually reduce expenses for BofA in 2009, ­making it easier for the bank to hit its first-­quarter numbers.

Thain’s work for the year was essentially done. On December 19, he decamped with his ­family to their vacation home in Vail, Colorado, where they would spend the holidays. When the transaction closed on January 1, Thain, the 12th and final chief executive in ­Merrill’s 94-year ­history, was 1,700 miles away from the company headquarters in New York.

Before leaving for Colorado, Thain had negotiated a new title for himself: president of global banking, securities and wealth management at BofA. He would be responsible for planning and executing the merger of ­Merrill’s banking and trading business with that of BofA. In this portion of the deal, ­Merrill employees would emerge the winners, with thousands of BofA staffers laid off and replaced by their Merrill counterparts.

But in early January, signs of dissatisfaction towards Thain erupted within Merrill. McCann, head of the firm’s “thundering herd”, resigned. The news was no surprise to employees who attended the town hall meeting in September, just after the merger was announced.

In response to a question, Thain chided McCann for leaking a story to the press, then continued to rebuke him to such an extent that others were embarrassed. Following that encounter, Thain declined to promote McCann to the management level directly beneath him in the merged company, a slap in the face.

A few days later, Fleming tendered his resignation to accept a teaching position at Yale Law School, his alma mater. More than McCann’s departure, Fleming’s resignation caused concern about Thain in North Carolina. Fleming had been the prime mover behind the BofA merger, and was well liked in Charlotte. If Lewis had had any illusions about how some of Thain’s top deputies felt towards their boss, those illusions vanished.

On January 16, BofA and Merrill reported their fourth-quarter numbers. Merrill’s were disastrous: $21bn in operating losses, the worst ­performance in the bank’s history, even worse than the poor performances of Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs. Still, Lewis told listeners in a ­conference call that he was happy that Thain had joined the BofA ­management team.

Lewis had other problems. In early January, BofA’s share price sunk from $14 towards $10 per share. Shortly before the earnings announcement, it emerged that Lewis had lobbied the government in late December for an infusion of as much as $20bn in new capital, and a guarantee for some of Merrill’s weakest assets, in order to consummate the deal.

BofA’s stock price plunged into single digits, shareholders were outraged and ­several class-action lawsuits were filed, accusing Lewis of withholding important information prior to the December 5 vote to approve the Merrill deal. The bank issued a carefully worded statement saying that up until the second week of December, Merrill’s losses were in line with expectations.

A week after the earnings announcement, the FT published a story about early payment of the nearly $4bn in bonuses to Merrill Lynch employees. Outraged, Andrew Cuomo, New York State’s attorney-general, launched an investigation. Even though BofA executives had been actively involved in the timetable and payment of the bonuses, the bank sent a statement to the FT blaming Thain.

They had found the opportunity they’d been looking for: Thain would take the fall for bonuses and for as much else as they could lump on him. The BofA statement was a clear sign that the end was near for Thain. But in his office on the 32nd floor, the former chief executive didn’t seem to notice. He had just purchased 8,400 shares of his new company’s stock and was finalising plans for a forthcoming trip to Davos for the World Economic Forum.

Lewis flew up to New York on January 22 to fire Thain. While he was still aboard the BofA corporate jet, the purpose of his trip was disclosed in the media, along with the damning details of Thain’s $1.2m office redesign. On BofA’s trading floor in New York, where employees were angry about what the purchase of Merrill had done to their stock, a televised image of Lewis prompted a round of boos. ­Subsequently, the news that Thain was about to be fired sparked enthusiastic applause.

And so, just before noon, with all of Wall Street tipped off, the embattled Lewis fired the only executive in the organisation capable of replacing him at that moment as chief executive. It was a move designed for self-preservation in more ways than one.

Criticism of Lewis had reached ­deafening levels as it became apparent that he had overpaid for Merrill. Although Fleming was the prime negotiator on ­Merrill’s side of the transaction, it seemed as though Thain had got the better of Lewis during that frenzied September weekend.

In the wake of his firing when Thain apologised for the office redecoration and promised to reimburse the company, many of his former charges unburdened themselves about his failings, real and perceived. His supporters lashed back, blaming a venomous culture at Merrill that never embraced Thain as its new leader.

Was Thain the man in the bubble, brilliant at understanding the complex technical issues surrounding turn-of-the-century banking but deaf to the world beyond Wall Street, or even to dissenting voices in his own ranks? And if so, was he really so different from his peers?

On October 6, Richard Fuld testified before congressmen about the collapse of his bank, Lehman Brothers. In what amounted to an admission of Wall Street’s blindness towards the financial mess it created, he said: “Not that anyone on this committee cares about this, but I wake up every single night thinking, ‘What could I have done differently? What could I have said? What should I have done?’ And I come back to this: at the time I made those decisions, I made those decisions with the information I had. I can look at you and say, this is a pain that will stay with me the rest of my life.”

It was a speech more human than Thain has given. But then again, Merrill did not fail. It’s also the sort of speech the rest of Wall Street has yet to deliver even as it asks for billions more in taxpayer support.

Back in his office, the office that even some of his supporters feel betrayed by, John Thain is neither superhero nor the robotic demon he’s made out to be by detractors. He shows us a favourite item in the room.

For all the money lavished elsewhere by his designer, this, a painting from Steven Spielberg, cost nothing. It was a gift to commemorate Dreamworks Animation’s initial public offering in 2004 and it depicts the ogre Shrek alighting from a carriage with his bride, Princess Fiona. It’s not a castle they’re bound for: the pair are about to ascend the steps of the New York Stock Exchange.

Read more about the history of Goldman Sachs by reading the book, The Partnership: The Making of Goldman Sachs.

Source.

Filed under  //   Alberto Cribore   Bank of ­America   Bear Stearns   Big Board   BlackRock   Bloomberg   Bob McCann   Goldman Sachs Group   Greg Fleming   John Alexander Thain   John Thain   Jon Corzine   JPMorgan Chase   Kenneth Lewis   Larry Fink   Lehman Brothers   Lone Star Funds   Merrill Lynch   New York Stock Exchange   Richard Grasso   Stan O’Neal   The Adventures of SuperThain  

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Bank of America Is Not Citigroup!

Bank of America is not Citigroup. It shouldn't need to raise more equity and dilute shareholders. It will post a profit in the first quarter and all of 2009, absent a market meltdown worse than what we're now seeing. And, when the economy recovers, it will be an earnings powerhouse.

That's the message chief executive officer Ken Lewis is delivering to anyone willing to listen. Investors, however, are skeptical. The bank's stock (BAC) was skidding toward $3 late last week, versus $37 a year ago -- off by 91%. Citigroup (C) shares plunged an even more precipitous 95%, dropping from $21 and change to a buck in the same span.

Citi's swoon has been exacerbated lately by the announcement that it will boost its capital base by converting much of its preferred stock into common, diluting the interests of existing common shareholders. That's precisely what bears say will happen at Bank of America . And the coming government "stress test" of banks' financial strength has fanned further doubts about the bank. The test's nature is known; its specifics aren't.

BofA has a chance of averting Citi's fate. The measure of capital adequacy favored by many big investors is tangible equity, equity minus goodwill, as a percentage of tangible assets. It gives them a feel for how much of a cushion a bank has left to absorb losses on loans or securities gone bad.

BofA's tangible equity ratio is 2.68%, and its tangible equity as a percentage of risk-adjusted assets is 3.6%. Lewis theorizes that regulators would like to see banks' tangible equity at 3%, and says that BofA should get there by the end of the year. But 4% is the number often discussed by investors.

Citigroup's tangible equity, now at about 1.5%, is expected to jump close to 4% after it converts its preferred. In contrast, JPMorgan's (JPM) tangible equity is 3.8%, and will improve now that the bank has slashed its dividend by 87%.

To boost tangible equity to 3%, Bank of America would have to raise its equity base by $8 billion, assuming that the total amount of its assets remains unchanged. The equity needed would be lower if the assets were reduced. BofA hopes to reach 3% through a combination of retained earnings, asset sales and shrinking its balance sheet.

"It's our earnings power that people are missing," Lewis says. "We can absorb a lot of [hits] and still be profitable." In fact, Bank of America, which now includes Countrywide Financial and Merrill Lynch, could generate more than $100 billion in revenue this year -- after mark-to-market write-downs. It could also post $45 billion to $50 billion of pre-tax, pre-provision income, out of which it could absorb losses on loans or boost its reserves against them.

Lewis contends that, despite problems at its credit-card unit, Merrill and elsewhere, Bank of America will be profitable this quarter and for all of 2009, unless things get a lot worse. He won't be specific, but Wall Street expects the bank to lose one cent a share in the first quarter and earn 57 cents this year, according to Thomson Reuters. In comparison, Citigroup is seen losing 30 cents a share this quarter and 70 cents this year.

To raise its tangible equity, Charlotte, N.C.-based Bank of America could unload assets. It put First Republic Bank, a private-banking specialist, on the block, and could sell Columbia Management and Balboa Insurance. Columbia and its affiliates oversee more than $386 billion for individuals and institutions.

Thanks to its Merrill Lynch acquisition this year, BofA also owns 49% of BlackRock (BLK), which manages $1.3 trillion in assets. It doesn't need both Columbia and BlackRock. Columbia could fetch $3 billion to $4 billion, even in this depressed market. Balboa, which the bank picked up when it bought Countrywide, could be worth at least $14 million, according to SNL Financial.

Lewis also notes that BofA's Tier 1 capital ratio of 10.6% is well above the 6% level regulators usually deem adequate. This ratio is the bank's core equity capital as a percentage of its risk-weighted assets. However, because this calculation includes preferred stock, many investors believe it overstates a bank's strength. Citigroup's Tier 1 ratio, after all, is 11.9%.

If Bank of America can avoid Citi's fate and the economy and markets improve, stockholders could eventually benefit from something that the crisis has forced: a massive buildup of BofA's loss reserves. At the end of 2008, they stood at $23.5 billion, almost double the year-earlier level. If the need to keep boosting these reserves ended, the bank would boast impressive earnings power.

In 2003, Merrill Lynch earned $4 billion, Countrywide made $2.37 billion and Bank of America had $10.76 billion of net income. The BofA figure doubled three years later, just as the U.S. mortgage madness was peaking.

Add in some $8 billion of cost savings from inefficiencies that have been eliminated by the merger of the three businesses and the new Bank of America could crank out $25 billion, or roughly $4 a share, of after-tax earnings when the good times return. That's an iffy vision, admittedly, but one that makes BofA a decent speculation at under $3.25 a share.

Source.

Filed under  //   Bank of America   BlackRock   Citigroup   Countrywide Financial   JPMorgan Chase   Ken Lewis   Merrill Lynch   Tangible Equity  

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Interview with CEO of Bank of America Ken Lewis

Ken Lewis, Chief Executive of Bank of America, has grown accustomed to public scrutiny in recent months. Initially lauded as a Wall Street hero for his high-stakes acquisition of Merrill Lynch in September 2008, he was later lambasted for overpaying for the investment bank and for allowing Merrill to pay staff bonuses amid mounting multibillion-dollar losses.

Mr Lewis, 61, who became BofA's chief executive in 2001, has faced criticism for his acquisitions before. When he led BofA's acquisition of Fleet National Bank in 2004, many analysts expressed scepticism over the price of the deal and the bank's ability to wring value out of the combination.

In this interview, Mr Lewis reiterated his belief in the long-term value of BofA's acquisition of Merrill Lynch, but allowed that the size of the government aid to support the deal had been a "tactical mistake" because it put the bank at risk of appearing weak.

He also expressed concern that limits on executive compensation for the 20 most highly paid executives could lead to a loss of revenue-generating talent.

Do you regret your acquisition of Merrill Lynch?

I'd be less than honest to say that I haven't had my moments, but I always try to step back and say don't judge it by this time and look forward. I still think it's a compelling, strategic acquisition and we're going to be awfully happy to have done it over time.

You have been accused of overpaying when you could have picked Merrill up for almost nothing two days later. What was your motivation?

We knew they had another offer to buy about 9.9 per cent of the company from Goldman [Sachs]. We also heard that there was some discussion with Morgan Stanley as well. So we thought rather than getting into a bidding contest later on we should just go ahead and get it done because the strategic reasons for doing it were so compelling.

Was there a moment when you would have preferred to pull out of the deal?

We did in fact think about doing that . . . and consulted with the government about filling the hole [in Merrill's balance sheet] if we didn't get out. We were strongly advised that the best thing to do was to go forward with the deal on time. While we made the final decision, we relied heavily on that advice because we respected the opinions of the various agencies.

Was taking additional Tarp money to support the deal the right thing to do?

I wish we had not taken as much as we did because it put us in a league too far out of some of the others who had not taken as much. Clearly we were doing that in an abundance of caution. So if I had to admit a tactical mistake I would have taken less than we took . . . probably $10bn less.

Have you been surprised by the strings attached to the Tarp money?

I've been surprised at the reaction of the public for those that have taken the Tarp money when we were doing what we thought was in the best interest of the country.

Were you adequately consulted on Merrill's plans to pay bonuses?

We knew of the bonuses and the process and we had input into it. The issue was that we could advise, but not make the final decision. There was disagreement on a number of things, but we're in the middle of litigation on that issue so I should stop there.

Has public scrutiny of the uses of Tarp money changed how you operate?

We're very focused on the cosmetics of trips and things of that nature, where meetings are held, personal use of the aircraft. We've changed some policies, but not really in the way we operate the business fundamentally.

Are the limits applied to executive compensation reasonable?

I think it's reasonable for the top five, let's say. There's no push back on me not getting an incentive, but when you start talking about the top 20 you're getting into some revenue producers that can really hurt your company if they leave. There are foreign banks hiring and there are boutique investment banks hiring. So there is a place for the top revenue producers to go and we've got to find a way to be able to pay them and keep them.

Are you confident that Bank of America will pass the stress test?

I think we'll pass the stress test. I don't know anything now to cause me to think that we wouldn't pass.

If a bank fails the stress test, do you think nationalisation is a legitimate government response?

No - I think some rehabilitation will have to take place, but I don't think nationalisation would be the answer. The banks do have six months to remedy whatever the issue would be. So that seems reasonable.

What's your view of this proposed public/private partnership to buy up some of the toxic debt?

Most people like the concept but the devil's in the details. Conceptually, it sounds good.

Is there a way round the problem that banks don't want to sell at too great a loss, but private investors don't want to buy at too high a price?

I don't know how you resolve it. There's a pretty big gap of profit that could be used to strike the right chord between the investor and the seller. Then you've got obviously cheap financing through the government that should make a deal possible. I have optimism that something could be worked out.

Source.

Filed under  //   Bank of America   Fleet National Bank   Goldman Sachs Group   Ken Lewis   Merrill Lynch   TARP  

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Overpaid Economic Saboteurs?

Investment banking is suffering an identity crisis. The industry needs its best talent to get back on a stable footing. Yet the public thinks masters of the universe are overpaid economic saboteurs who deserve punishment. One man embodies the paradox: Andrea Orcel.

Merrill Lynch’s global head of investment banking is said to be the driving force behind an eye-popping $550m of revenue last year – 16% of his division’s total. The $100bn break-up of ABN Amro was his puppy. It’s the biggest banking deal in history – and likely will go down in the annals as the worst.

Orcel’s wits and charm have kept the likes of Banco Santander and Unicredit as repeat customers of Merrill’s services. He enjoyed glowing press coverage. The bigger reward was a $34m bonus for 2008. After Merrill’s sale to Bank of America, an initial demotion was followed by a promotion after senior defections left his new bosses realising they needed Orcel to help save the business before it crumbled completely.

But to the outside world, someone like Orcel is seen as an undesirable. He is now the target of a witch-hunt by New York’s attorney general. It’s easy to see why. Orcel got paid handsomely even as his own firm racked up $28bn of losses and the ABN deal led to the government bailouts of two of the three acquirers. It doesn’t matter that he was hardly alone in thinking the acquisition was a good idea.

Orcel may not have played recklessly with other people’s money the way Merrill’s traders did. But he has encouraged, and benefited from, several foolhardy transactions. His outsize pay in a year of deep cuts reinforces the industry’s greedy image.

All in all, Orcel represents much of what the industry needs to distance itself from. And yet investment banks need client-friendly leaders of his calibre if they are to thrive.

His personification of the crisis will one day make an ideal first slide in a business-school presentation. At this rate, even a die-hard dealmaker like Orcel might be better off deserting the banking battlefield for the serene pastures of academia. Then he could teach the lesson himself.

Source.

Filed under  //   ABN Amro   Andrea Orcel   Bank of America   Hedge Funds   Investment Banking   Merrill Lynch  

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The Black Hole of US Capitalism

The black holes of US capitalism are multiplying and growing larger. American International Group's quarterly loss of $62bn may be the largest in history, but the firm is hardly alone in its extraordinary ability to destroy capital. When large complex financial firms grow unstable and start to collapse, the implosion is nearly impossible to stop. Gigantic amounts of financial matter are being sucked in, maybe never to be seen again.

Outside viewers cannot directly see the tremendous capital destruction – many assets within these firms have no observable price. One must rely on indirect signs such as managerial estimates or governmental bailout packages to gauge the size of losses.

They are huge. Three governmental aid packages totalling $150bn haven’t proven sufficient for AIG. The government was forced to pony up another $30bn worth of aid Monday and there’s little assurance this will be sufficient.

Mortgage agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are equally impressive. Fannie just reported a $25bn loss for the fourth quarter, and says this year’s results may be worse than 2008. The government has pledged up to $400bn to prop up the two.

Other collapses may prove equally difficult to halt. The US injected $45bn into Citigroup, converted its preference shares for common equity while strong-arming other investors to do the same and guaranteed more than $300bn of its assets, yet the company’s $1.50 stock price suggests more is needed.

Bank of America boss Ken Lewis recently claimed that the Countywide and Merrill Lynch were “stars” in the troubled company’s firmament. An odd, but perhaps apt, word choice if the additional mass from these bodies pushes BofA beyond critical mass. The continuing slide in its share price suggests there’s more bailing out of BofA to come.

The Milky Way of American capitalism has so many black holes because complex financial firms clustered in centers like New York and grew large on cheap monetary fuel. But they exist elsewhere. Indeed, they are also common in the British Isles sub-galaxy, where RBS and Northern Rock have sucked in tremendous amounts of financial matter.

Of course, not every star has the needed mass, leverage or complexity to become a black hole. Yet the future of many firms that avoid falling over the edge is hardly bright. Investors’ distrust of leverage, stricter governmental regulation, and slower economic growth mean they may be doomed to red dwarf status.

Source.

Filed under  //   AIG   Bank of America   Capitalism   Citigroup   Countrywide   Fannie Mae   Freddie Mac   Kenneth Lewis   Merrill Lynch   New York  

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Physicists Provide Insight Into Markets

Imagine a group of physicists looked into the global financial industry. What remarkable things could they find? Covariance strategies? New risk management models? The origin and prevention of asset price bubbles? Or, how about, who controls the global stock market?

Josh Reviews Everything points us to this paper, titled “The backbone of complex networks and corporations: Who is controlling them?” on the physics arXiv blog. The premise looks promising.

Physics arXiv summarises: The study of complex networks has given us some remarkable insights into the nature of systems as diverse as forest fires, the internet and earthquakes. This kind of work is even beginning to give econophysicists a glimmer of much-needed insight in the nature of our economy. In a major study, econophysicists have today identified the most powerful companies in the world based on their ability to control stock markets around the globe. it makes uncomfortable reading…Now James Glattfelder and Stefano Battiston at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich have included these factors in a study of the control and ownership of stockmarkets in 48 countries around the world…

Using physics methodology the authors have found the backbones of the global economy — the 10 most powerful companies in the global financial industry, as measured by stock ownership. They are:

1. The Capital Group Companies
2. Fidelity Management & Research
3. Barclays PLC
4. Franklin Resources
5. AXA
6. JPMorgan Chase & Co
7. Dimensional Fund Advisors
8. Merrill Lynch & Co
9. Wellington Management Company
10. UBS

As Josh Reviews Everything points out — these are a bunch of enormous fund managers and massive market-maker banks. Not really surprising, then. In fact, Josh goes so far as to title his post “OBVIOUS tag, where are you?” exclaiming: “OMG. They’ve just discovered that funds managers and market-maker banks own a lot of shares! What a scandal!”

There is some intriguing material stuff in the report. For instance, this graph below, which plots the dispersion of control for various countries.  The X-axis is a measure for the local dispersion of control and the Y-axis indicates global concentration of control.  The paper notes:

Figure 11

In Fig.11 the log-values of ’s’ and ‘h’ are plotted against each other. The ’s’ coordinates of the countries are as expected: to the right we see the presence of widely held firms (i.e. the local dispersion of control) for the Anglo-Saxon countries, AU, GB and the US. FR, IT, JP are located to the left, reflecting more concentrated local control.

However, what is astonishing is that there is a counterintuitive trend to be observed in the data: the more local control is dispersed, the higher the global concentration of control becomes. In essence what looks like a democratic distribution of control from close up, by taking a step back, actually turns out to warp into highly concentrated control in the hands of very few shareholders.

It has been known for over 75 years that the Anglo-Saxon countries have the highest occurrence of widely held firms. This statement, that the control of corporations is dispersed amongst many shareholders, invokes the intuition that there exists a multitude of owners that only hold a small amount of shares in a few companies.

However, in contrast to such intuition, our main finding is that a local dispersion of control is associated with a global concentration of control and value. This means that only a small elite of shareholders continually reappears as the controlling entity of all the stocks, without ever having been previously detected or reported on.

On the other hand, in countries with local concentration of control (mostly observed in European states), the shareholders tend to only exert control over a single corporation, resulting in the dispersion of global control and value.

Finally we also observe that the US financial sector holds the seat of power at an international level. It will remain to be seen, if the continued unfolding of the current financial crisis will tip this balance of power, as the US financial land-scape faces a fundamental transformation in its wake.

Source.

Filed under  //   AXA   Barclays PLC   Dimensional Fund Advisors   Fidelity Management & Research   Franklin Resources   James Glattfelder   Josh Reviews Everything   JPMorgan Chase   Merrill Lynch   Physics arXiv   Stefano Battiston   Swiss Federal Institute of Technology   The Capital Group Companies   UBS   Wellington Management Company  

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