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Bill Ackman Continues to Fight Target

Hedge fund guru Bill Ackman is still fighting with Target Corp. as reported by the Wall Street Journal, Mr. Ackman has called a meeting in Manahattan on May 11, 2009, to introduce his five directors, which includes him, for election on May 28.Editing a post - Posterous

Target's stock has dropped 58% from September 2008 to March 2009, and rebounded recently with other stocks, but is currently down 39% from its peak of $70 in July 2007.

Target is prepared to fight Mr. Ackman and may spend around $11 million fighting this battle. Mr. Ackman was successful in pushing Target to sell a stake in its credit card portfolio and wants the company to sell more. Mr. Ackman estimates he will spend about $15 million fighting this battle as written in the Financial Times.

The Financial Times also reported that Mr. Ackman's Pershing Square hedge fund owns about $1bn in Target common stock along with options on another $280 million. The company's fund, Pershing Square IV, consists entirely of call options on Target stock. Mr. Ackman also said in an interview with the Financial Times that his agenda is also to fix corporate elections.

Mr. Ackman was not successful earlier in convincing Target management to spin off land it owns under its stores to create a public traded real estate investment trust, REIT.

Shareholders may be somewhat receptive to Mr. Ackman's offer seeing that  Walmart has been able to have strong growth despite the recession while Target's sales have been trailing Walmart's by up to 6 percentage points. In the past, Target has trailed Walmart's sales by only 1 or 2 precentage points as pointed out in the Wall Street Journal article.

Although somewhat hipper and cooler than Walmart, Kmart, or Sears, Target is about one sixth the size of Walmart in terms of market capitalization. In the first quarter of 2009, Target had an operating margin of 4.82 percent while Walmart had an operating margin of 5.84 percent.

Filed under  //   Bill Ackman   Kmart   REIT   Sears   Target   Walmart  

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Interview with Hedge Fund Manager Bill Ackman

The Optmist by Jesse Eisinger, Portfolio.com

Bill Ackman’s friends describe him in two ways. They offer the euphemism that the prominent hedge fund manager “does not suffer from low self-esteem.” Then they observe that he is optimistic, almost clinically so. A pop psychologist might diagnose Ackman with hypomania, a condition notable for persistently elevated moods but without the self-destructiveness of true mania.

“He doesn’t register reversals and defeats and hard feelings the way other people do,” says David Klafter, a former colleague. I ask Ackman about the condition while he is driving in a car with his family. He hasn’t heard of it, but says he is an “extremely resilient person.” His 11-year-old daughter playfully chides from the backseat, “And you’re modest.”

Ackman is an activist investor, a respectable term for people who in the 1980s were known as corporate raiders. He buys big stakes in companies and then offers his opinions, loudly, on how to improve their operations. Often, Ackman has been a contrarian.

He bought shares of Rockefeller Center when Manhattan real estate was on its back in the mid-1990s, and he launched an attack in 2002 on MBIA Inc., the powerful and politically connected bond insurer, when everyone else on Wall Street was convinced the company was gold-plated. In early 2007, he sounded one of the most prescient warnings about the credit bubble and the leveraged complex of American finance.

William A. Ackman, who turns 43 this month, has had the seminal financial career of the past two decades, which is to say that he’s had the seminal American career of the era. Almost immediately after business school, he started a hedge fund to manage millions for wealthy people with no investing track record.

About a decade later, he was forced to shut down. He endured regulatory investigations played out in the klieg lights of the press. He relaunched and clawed his way back to respectability, becoming a member of a new generation of Wall Street wise men. No hedge fund manager or investment banker will be able to replicate his trajectory for at least a generation.

Now he’s gearing up for one of the biggest battles of his professional life. After losing nearly $2 billion in a calamitous bet on the retailer Target Corp., almost all that investors had given him for the investment, he is waging a proxy fight against the company. He will have a tough sell in the leadup to the annual shareholder meeting in May. Taking on a company as big as Target is almost unheard of. Target decries the contest as “costly and disruptive.”

Investors don’t want to hear much from hedge funds these days, and the tide may be turning against activism. Panicked companies are focusing on their core business, not their capital structure. At the same time, Ackman is talking about a much bigger turnaround situation: the United States.

On a recent day in his glass-walled corner office in midtown Manhattan, he tells me with a smile, “I’m long America!” His tie is slightly loosened, and the sleeves on his blue shirt are rolled up. He is crafting a “plan to save the universe,” he says, with a slight glint that shows he is aware of the hyperbole.

He recounts how he and Michael Porter, a Harvard Business School professor, recently had a fantastic meeting with Lawrence Summers, the director of President Barack Obama’s National Economic Council, to pitch their proposals for fixing the financial crisis and improving the market for mortgages.

“I’m long-term bullish on America but not on things turning around in the next few months, or even 12 months,” he says. “We’ve had the equivalent of a heart attack, but now we are in recovery, hopefully. It takes time to heal.”

These days, the public, enraged at the moneyed class of Wall Street operators, is in revolt over bonuses and rewards for failure, while Washington plans new regulations for hedge funds, and investors pull their money out of the industry. Ackman, who has been publicly vilified, can’t keep himself away from the spotlight. It’s almost in his nature to stand up and say that he has answers.

Overconfidence from financial types is what caused this grave economic crisis in the first place, of course. It can be a worrisome quality. But if you are Bill Ackman, you’re betting that confidence, correctly administered, might just get us out of it too.

Though often perceived as arrogant, Ackman up close might be the most winning salesman on Wall Street. Partly it’s because he explains each burst of an idea with overwhelming detail, lucidly laid out. But it also has to do with his boyish face, a rounded-off nose and high, rosy cheeks topped incongruously with a signature shock of gray hair that he’s had since high school. Going prematurely gray builds character, Ackman says.

“He’s gained a huge following of admirers, both male and female,” says Laurel Touby, founder of the internet company MediaBistro.com, which Ackman helped bankroll. “People fall in love with him. It’s almost like he’s the Bill Clinton of finance.”

Ackman thinks that the financial rescue of the banks, a plan which has been carried over from the Bush administration, is wrongheaded. And months before his meeting with Summers, that began to concern him. “I always thought the country would survive Washington. Now I feel like I have a civic duty if I have a decent idea for how to solve a financial problem,” he tells me.

A few weeks later, we speak again. “I’m so busy it’s driving me crazy,” he says. “Every day I don’t get this plan out, I feel the country is going to ruin.” In unguarded moments, he has a tendency to become grandiose. In public settings, he’s learned to restrain himself, speaking in interviews with a curious calm.

Ackman believes that the financial-system bailout has been flawed. The government has put taxpayer money into financial institutions at the wrong time and in the wrong place within their capital structures.

So far, we’ve aimlessly given billions to banks. That money could wind up going toward bonuses, dividends, or interest payments on debt, merely delaying the inevitable failure of the insolvent ones. Many economists argue for more aggressive nationalization of insolvent banks, but policymakers have been reluctant to take that route, wary of harming bondholders.

Ackman wants these creditors turned into the equity holders of insolvent banks, through carefully adjudicated reorganization processes, before the government ponies up more money.

Ackman and Porter also worry that Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner’s rescue plan is overly focused on shoring up the securities and derivatives tied to mortgages. Instead, the duo would target the mortgages themselves in a way that they contend would be cheaper than the government’s approach.

Ackman likens the situation to a $100,000 house with a million-dollar insurance policy. When the house burns down, rather than paying off the policy, the house should just be rebuilt. Ackman’s idea is to have the government offer to buy defaulting mortgages for 50 cents on the dollar.

Such a guarantee would put a floor under the market and induce the owners, most of which are mortgage-servicing companies, to sell to the government if they can’t find better deals elsewhere. If values in the mortgage market stabilize, the result will be a beneficial cascade through the value of all those securities and derivatives. Leverage got us into this mess; Ackman wants to reverse it to get us out.

Even as the hedge fund business implodes from its own hubris, Ackman’s three main funds, which are separate from the Target fund, are doing okay, relatively speaking. They were down between 11 and 13 percent last year, much better than the average for hedge funds; he ended up with $4.4 billion under management. As of late March, his main funds were up about 3 percent, while the market had fallen double digits.

Ackman, the son of an affluent commercial-mortgage broker, spent his childhood in Chappaqua, New York. At Harvard Business School, he came off as bright, though sometimes a bit to the manor born. During a case study of Steinway & Sons, the pianomakers, he told the class that he had several pianos, seeming to assume that everyone else did too. Ackman’s family owned two Steinways and a Yamaha, but they had inherited all three.

He would say back then that his goal was to allocate as much of the world’s capital to himself as he could so that he could then reallocate it in the way that he thought was best. “He was a larger-than-life guy and came across that way, even in business school,” a former classmate recalls.

Soon after he graduated, he and a classmate, David Berkowitz, formed Gotham Partners, an investment firm. They shared an apartment to save money. One of the bedrooms was much larger than the other, and the two budding Masters of the Universe decided to have a closed-bid auction to figure out who would get the better room.

Each wrote down the portion of the rent he was willing to shoulder to win the larger spot. Ackman remembers that he convinced Berkowitz that he badly wanted the big room when actually he was content with the smaller one. He contrived to drive up Berkowitz’s bid, making his part of the rent a fraction of his partner and roommate’s.

Ackman entertained the notion that he and Berkowitz might be able to raise tens of millions of dollars for Gotham’s launch and he managed to talk his way into meeting with many of the wealthy and powerful moguls that he’d set his sights on.

He pitched real estate scion Tom Durst and proposed three investment ideas to demonstrate Gotham’s research capacity. Durst declined to invest with the firm but then, according to Ackman, put his own money to work in the companies that Ackman and Berkowitz had recommended. After each had big gains in a matter of months, Durst came back to them and agreed to put money into their fund.

Gotham didn’t come up with anything close to Ackman’s hoped-for sum, mustering only $3.1 million. But in 1993, he and Berkowitz went ahead and launched the fund anyway. In time, Gotham gathered in millions. The Ziff family came in early; legendary investors such as Jack Nash, Leon Levy, Michael Steinhardt, and Seth Klarman also put money in.

In 1994, Gotham bought shares in a real estate investment trust poised to take control of Rockefeller Center, effectively becoming the largest holder of the real estate complex. At the time, the New York commercial real estate market was in a devastating slump. Thrusting himself into a highly publicized takeover battle, Ackman scored huge returns on his investment when the REIT was bought. He was on the map.

Over the next three years, his fund averaged returns of 40 percent annually after fees. Gotham hardly ever shorted or bet against companies. But one day in early 2002, Whitney Tilson, a friend of Ackman’s since their days at Harvard College, called him at home to recommend that he buy a stake in a company called Farmer Mac, the Fannie Mae of farm mortgages.

Ackman printed the annual report and started reading it around 9 that night. Riveted, he continued past midnight. He called Tilson first thing the next morning, excited. Farmer Mac was indeed an opportunity, but Tilson had it wrong. Ackman didn’t want to buy the stock; he wanted to short it.

Gotham placed its bearish bets. Then Ackman confronted a problem—how to get his negative message out. He began by talking to a reporter at the New York Times but didn’t think the resulting story made the case strongly enough, so he set up a website for the express purpose of displaying a report he wrote, with disclosures that his fund was short Farmer Mac’s stock. Going public on a short is an invitation to be attacked by companies and investors.

Ackman relished the frenzy that ensued. He’s still proud of the report’s title, “Buying the Farm.” And he profited spectacularly from the results: By fall, Farmer Mac’s stock had collapsed.

Fresh from the Farmer Mac success, Ackman launched an audacious assault on MBIA, a company at the center of both Wall Street and state and local finance across the country. This move would prove remarkably insightful once the financial crisis hit, but vindication would be years in coming. First, Ackman was forced to undergo a remarkable battle with the company and its regulators.

MBIA dominated a sleepy, safe, and wonderful business: insuring municipal bonds from default. Since muni bonds almost never defaulted, MBIA almost never had to pay off the insurance.

When Ackman surveyed the company’s filings, he realized that MBIA had, to a degree utterly unrecognized by Wall Street, shifted into the business of insuring a vast array of much more dangerous paper: collateralized-debt obligations, or CDOs, which were constructed by the big banks to combine the bonds of multiple companies.

Expecting MBIA to default, Gotham began buying credit-default swaps, a form of short-selling in the unregulated derivatives market. If other investors became worried that MBIA would default, Ackman could sell the credit-default swaps for a gain; if MBIA actually did default, he would make a king’s ransom.

MBIA got wind of Ackman’s research and asked to meet with him. On November 21, 2002, Gotham representatives sat down with top MBIA executives. As people who were there recall the meeting, Jay Brown, the CEO of MBIA, began by saying how long he had been in the insurance business.

“No one has ever questioned my reputation or my company’s,” he said. “You are using an unregulated market to manipulate a regulated market,” referring to MBIA’s insurance business. “You’re a young guy. It’s early in your career. You want to think very hard before you release that report,” Brown said, pointing out that MBIA was the largest guarantor of municipal bonds in New York State and the country.

“Is there anything you disagree with or that’s factually inaccurate?” Ackman asked. “This is not about the facts,” Brown replied. “Let’s put it this way: We have friends in high places.” An MBIA spokesperson says that the purpose of the meeting was to learn Ackman’s intentions and to request an early copy of his report to be able to point out any inaccuracies.

The tense encounter lasted less than a half-hour. As they walked out, Ackman’s analyst shook Brown’s hand. Ackman then held his hand out to the CEO. Brown looked at it, lifted his arm up, and said, “I don’t think so.”

The hedge fund young turks walked away feeling threatened, thinking that MBIA would sue them. Ackman, though, was also exhilarated. On December 9, 2002, Gotham put out a devastating 66-page summation of the company’s precarious financial position called “Is MBIA Triple A?”

Nothing much happened. The stock actually went up that day. The months that followed probably mark the period during which Ackman’s optimism-to-reality ratio hit a peak. As the case against MBIA was building, Gotham was falling down. Ackman and Berkowitz’s performance had been lackluster for several years running.

Gotham had made several investments in privately held companies, and like many hedge funds in 2008, it found itself stuck with these illiquid assets as some investors were asking for their money back. Ackman and Berkowitz decided they had to wind Gotham down.

Things got worse. In January 2003, the office of then New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer subpoenaed Ackman. The Securities and Exchange Commission began an informal inquiry a few weeks later. At first glance, Gotham’s MBIA report looked as if it might be a case of a hedge fund trying to generate a huge amount of negative attention for a stock and then profit from the fear, a “short and distort” campaign. Gotham was pilloried in the press.

A dual investigation is almost every hedge fund manager’s nightmare. Not Ackman’s. “Now I’m going to be able to sit across from Eliot Spitzer and explain to him my concerns!” he told his skeptical Gotham colleagues.

Between March and June, the attorney general’s investigators hauled him in for six grueling days of testimony. Aaron Marcu, Ackman’s lawyer, tried to rein him in and keep him from saying anything that might later be used against him. Once, he interrupted Ackman to tell him he had already answered a question.

“Leave me alone,” Ackman snapped. “I’m not finished yet.” With that, he rose, unbidden, to a large pad perched on an easel and started diagramming MBIA’s serpentine financial structure. He expected to flip the AG’s team against MBIA. Remarkably, he succeeded.

After a nearly four-year-long investigation, MBIA agreed to settle civil securities-fraud cases with the SEC and the attorney general’s office, paying $75 million in fines and restating seven years of earnings. David Klafter, who was then working as Gotham’s general counsel, says, “How often does a complaint go to a regulator and it boomerangs and the complainant ends up getting sanctioned? Not often, right? It happened to Bill.”

By January 2004, Ackman was back in the investment business, launching his current hedge fund, Pershing Square Capital Management. Over the next few years, he honed his approach to shareholder activism, scoring big investment wins with Wendy’s and McDonald’s.

Throughout that time, though, MBIA’s stock held strong. Employees at Pershing Square “thought I had gone off the deep end. And there were investors who did not invest in Pershing Square because they thought I had just lost it on this MBIA thing,” Ackman says.

As time went on, he couldn’t stop thinking about the company. “I have trouble saying ‘MBA’ without saying ‘MBIA,’ ” he tells me. Once he was walking down a street on Manhattan’s Upper West Side, and he saw a woman wearing a sweatshirt with MBIA on it.

Was it some kind of division of the company that he didn’t know about, he wondered? He repeated the word on the sweatshirt out loud to himself: “Co-loo-M-B-I-A, Co-loo-M-B-I-A.” Suddenly, he realized he was looking at a woman dressed in Columbia University garb.

In his office one recent late afternoon, he beckoned me over to his computer, with a look of pride. He launched a video of two young girls performing a catchy, singsongy tune. A few years ago, his two daughters had composed this song-and-dance routine as a present for their father:

MBIA is a bad company
They make people promises
    they don’t keep
MBIA is a bad company
MBIA is a bad company
They lie to people and the
    government and do bad things
MBIA is a bad company
MBIA is a bad company
Yes it is. Yes it is. Yes it is.

Ackman’s MBIA investment led him to a conclusion that proved pivotal in light of the coming credit crisis. In the spring of 2007, when the Dow was over 13,000 and the world was awash in money, he began giving a speech to investors called “Who’s Holding the Bag?”

The talk began with a warning that a virtuous credit cycle works viciously in reverse. It discussed the risks in mortgage-backed collateralized-debt obligations, corporate lending, and commercial real estate markets. He raised alarms about the credit-rating agencies’ conflicts of interest in the structured-finance market.

He concluded that since the most highly rated paper, the triple-A portion, was more vulnerable than anyone realized because of poor lending, bond insurers like MBIA were in deep trouble. And if they were in trouble, all the parties that thought they were insured would also be in trouble. “When the losses hit, these guarantees will have no value, and counterparties are left holding the bag,” he said.

Few investors bought it at the time, but that’s exactly what happened over the next two years. It became clear that bond insurers wouldn’t be able to make good on their insurance, so banks, the bond insurers’ customers, were forced to take hundreds of billions of dollars in losses. MBIA reported $1.9 billion in losses in 2007 and an additional $2.7 billion in 2008.

When Ackman started giving his talk, MBIA’s stock was in the upper $60s per share, close to an all-time high. By early March, MBIA was trading at approximately $3 a share. “The original thesis [about the company] was very much incorrect,” says Kevin Brown, MBIA’s spokesman. “I’m not going to deny his call on the mortgage market was correct.”

Late last year, Ackman closed out his MBIA positions. Overall, after six years of battle, his MBIA investments returned about $1.1 billion in profit. He has pledged all his personal proceeds to charity. He’s already donated about $50 million to his Pershing Square Foundation and to education causes and still owes about $100 million to make good on his promise.

Perhaps more surprising, Ackman managed to turn Spitzer into one of his defenders. While Spitzer was governor of New York, they met to discuss mortgage insurers, including MBIA. Today, Spitzer says of short-sellers, “In terms of contribution to the marketplace, they are critically important and unpopular because of it. We know there’s bias in favor of affirmative analytical work.”

The former governor also tells me, “Bill is extremely smart,” adding that “he is obviously a guy who understands finance.” When I ask Ackman how he feels now that this epic Wall Street battle is over, he pauses maybe for the first time that I’ve heard since we’ve met. He laughs uncomfortably. “I don’t feel like it’s over because MBIA still exists,” he says finally.

Despite his insight about the precariousness of the financial system, Ackman puzzlingly didn’t follow through to anticipate the pain of the American consumer. That led to a series of mistaken investments in retail. His Target investment has been the worst of all.

In 2007, he set up a special fund to invest in a single stock in a highly leveraged way. In a sign of how frothy the markets were, he raised $2 billion from start to finish in a week, about two-thirds of which came from other hedge funds. Investors knew the outlines of the investment but not that it would be in Target.

In his main funds, Ackman buys big positions in a few stocks. He maintains little leverage to reduce the risks inherent in this concentrated investing style. But he gets his risk jones on with single-stock funds. They are at once flying-too-close-to-the-sun ventures and deeply savvy moves. Even if the ideas flop, he is still in business.

Ackman urged Target’s management to sell its credit-card business to get rid of consumer-credit exposure and use the proceeds to buy back stock. He also wanted the company to realize the underlying value of its vast real estate holdings. Target bought back stock, but so far that has been a poor use of money. The company also moved partly on his credit-card suggestion but hasn’t heeded his real estate advice.

By the fall of last year, Ackman was getting into a bad spot. Some of his long-dated options were set to expire at the beginning of 2009. He couldn’t renegotiate them in the middle of the market panic.

On October 29, Ackman rented a giant theater in the Equitable Building in midtown Manhattan. He presented to hundreds of investors and reporters his plan for Target to spin off its real estate into an innovative real estate investment trust. The lengthy, complicated presentation of roughly 150 slides took about an hour and a half, with an extra 15 minutes for questions.

Ackman wasn’t the only one under strain. Target’s sales in stores open a year or more were falling. In December, Gregg Steinhafel, the retailer’s CEO, came to New York to meet with some investors. He panned the REIT idea and said Ackman was simply buried in his position and trying to jack up the shares to get out. In a sign of frayed nerves, he also attacked customers of Kohl’s, one of Target’s competitors, as having “low IQs.” Target smacked Ackman down twice, rejecting the proposal.

Target’s stock was tumbling; Ackman’s leveraged fund was doing much worse. By early March, as Target’s stock continued to fall, Ackman’s Target fund was down 93 percent.The broken investment led to at least one strained friendship. Hedge fund manager Dan Loeb had put money into the Target fund and had been bombarding Ackman with emails, demanding that he let him out of his investment or wind down the fund.

Loeb essentially ran an activist campaign against him, prompting Ackman to reorganize the fund: He waived management and incentive fees for investors in it, put $25 million of his own money in, and finally succeeded in extending the options. But he’s had enough of the excitement and leverage of a single-stock fund. “I think I may never do it again,” he says, chastened.

In early March, Ackman had another run-in with a New York State attorney general. Andrew Cuomo called him about the Target fund situation. “It’s kind of a scary way to begin a conversation with the AG!” Ackman says. But Cuomo was calling to compliment him on how he treated his investors in revamping the fund and waiving his fees, saying that is what the hedge fund business needs. “How cool is that?” asks Ackman, excited as a boy.

Some investors think Ackman doesn’t understand the subtleties of retailing. “Activists may have been well intentioned, but many have seriously hurt many retailers by urging them to buy back shares and to increase debt,” says David Berman, a retail investment specialist who runs the hedge fund Durbin Capital.

“Businesses were made unhealthy in front of our eyes, and management and boards were fooled by smooth-talking activists and bankers alike who misguided them.” Ackman counters that his advice has never saddled a company with too much debt.

By March, Ackman owned stock and controlled options in Target worth about 7 percent of the company. And he was gearing up for the big fight to get board seats. At Target’s annual meeting in May, Ackman is running for a position on the company’s board.

He has recruited four other candidates who have specialized in real estate, credit cards, and retailing to serve on his slate. “It’s going to be very high-minded,” he says of his campaign. But he is also evincing the old stubbornness. “The only Stalinesque election process in America is the election for directors of American corporations,” he tells me. “And I just think that’s wrong.”

Maybe because Ackman has lost so much money with Target, he’s been more reflective lately. “The investment business is about being confident enough to know that you’re right and everyone else is wrong. Yet you have to be humble enough that you recognize when you’ve made a mistake,” he says. “Earlier in my career, I think I had the confidence part pretty solid. But the humbleness part I had to learn.’’

While he concedes that the Target investment was structured badly at first, he won’t back down on it. It’s up more than 40 percent since he injected his own cash: “I continue to believe that the investment in Target is not a mistake.”

Bill Ackman remains optimistic.

Source.

Filed under  //   Andrew Cuomo   David Berman   David Klafter   Gotham Partners   Harvard Business School   Hedge Funds   Laurel Touby   Lawrence Summers   MBIA Inc.   MediaBistro.com   Michael Porter   Obama   Rockefeller Center   Target   Tim Geithner   William Ackman  

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Ackman Gets Aggresive with Target

Activist investor William Ackman is launching a proxy battle to replace five directors at Target Corp., the struggling retailer known for its trendy-but-affordable clothing and home furnishings.

Mr. Ackman, whose hedge fund Pershing Square Capital Management owns 7.8% of Target stock, says he will vie for one of the seats up for election at the annual meeting May 28. He will also propose a slate of other directors with experience in real estate, retailing and credit cards.

"We want directors with relevant expertise, who can draw from their personal experience when the board has a decision to make," Mr. Ackman said.

Target says he went public with his battle after he met with the 13-member board's nominating committee, which decided not to recommend him and two other candidates he suggested.

"We are disappointed that Pershing Square has decided to pursue a costly and disruptive proxy contest, especially in light of our previous dialogue," the company said in a prepared statement.

The New York hedge-fund manager has had some success in previous board battles. In 2007 he tried to oust the entire board of Ceridian Corp., a payroll company, and replace it with an alternative slate. Pershing Square agreed to a compromise that gave it four seats on the board; Ceridian was sold to buyout firm Thomas H. Lee Partners and insurer Fidelity National Financial Inc.

Two years ago, Mr. Ackman began amassing a stake in Target, but the Minneapolis-based retailer proved to be a bad bet. Target's stock has lost more than half of its value since then, as recession-weary consumers trade down to even less expensive stores and pull back spending on all but the most basic necessities.

In February, Target said its fourth-quarter profits sank 41% after a weak holiday season forced it to slash prices to clear out merchandise and its credit-card business lost money.

The Pershing Square fund that invests directly in Target stock and options lost 90% of its value last year. Last month, Mr. Ackman told investors in a letter that they could pull out of the fund and be paid in cash. "I apologize profusely for the fund's results to date," he wrote.

When Mr. Ackman first began investing in Target, his dealings with the retailer were friendly. Prompted by his suggestion, Target sold off a 47% interest in its credit-card business to JPMorgan Chase & Co for $3.6 billion.

Last fall, as Target's stock continued to fall amid slowing sales, Mr. Ackman proposed that Target spin off the land it owns into a separate, publicly traded real-estate investment trust. Many retailers lease most of their outlets, but Target owns 85% of the real estate for its stores so it can control store designs.

The big-box retailer ultimately rejected Mr. Ackman's plan, expressing concern about the costs, risks and loss of financial flexibility.

Two weeks ago, Pershing Square disclosed in a regulatory filing that it cut its stake in Target to 7.8% from almost 10%, but was negotiating to get its nominees on Target's board.

Mr. Ackman said he will try to elect Michael Ashner, chief executive of Winthrop Realty Trust; Jim Donald, the former CEO of Starbucks Corp.; governance expert Ronald Gilson and Richard Vague, who co-founded First U.S.A. Bank.

The company voiced its support for the current slate of directors up for reelection: Richard M. Kovacevich, chairman of Wells Fargo & Co.; Solomon Trujillo, chief executive of Telstra Corp.; Mary N. Dillon, global chief marketing officer for McDonald's Corp., and George W. Tamke, a partner at Clayton, Dubilier & Rice Inc.

A fifth seat was vacated when Robert Ulrich, a former Target chief executive, retired last year. The company hasnt named a candidate to replace him on the board.

Source.

Filed under  //   Ceridian   Fidelity National Financial   George W. Tamke   Mary N. Dillon   Michael Ashner   Pershing Square Capital Management   Pershing Square IV   Richard M. Kovacevich   Richard Vague   Robert Ulrich   Ronald Gilson   Solomon Trujillo   Target   Thomas H. Lee Partners   William Ackman   Winthrop Realty Trust  

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Ackman is Off Target on Target

Add another item to the list of daft ideas from the hedge fund boom: single-stock funds. The performance of Pershing Square Capital’s souped-up bet on US retailer Target should bury any argument for investments of this kind. They looked like silly ideas even when markets were rising. In a bear market they’re downright toxic.

Pershing Square, led by Bill Ackman, raised some $2bn two years ago to invest in a single company whose name was not disclosed. The fund then bought up to 13% of Target, including call options which would have ginned up returns had the stock risen.

But Target, like all retailers dependent on the American consumer, has been hard hit. Fold in the leverage provided by the fund's use of options, and Ackman’s investors have suffered an extra wallop. The fund sunk by a third last month and is down 93% since it was formed, Bloomberg reports, citing an email sent to investors.

Had the stock surged, investors would have enjoyed outsized gains. So would the fund manager by not having diluted the one-way bet with any others that might not have performed as well. In the perverse “heads I win, tails you lose” of the hedge fund industry’s boom-times, this was a big motivation for a single-stock fund.

But don’t cry for investors who foolishly abetted the Target fund. After all, they handed some $2bn over to Pershing Square in 2007 solely on the notion it would wager on a single iconic US stock. That’s not unlike the prospectus for a certain South Sea Company, which in 1711 solicited funds from investors for an undertaking of great advantage, but nobody to know what it is. 

Source.

Filed under  //   Bloomberg   Hedge Funds   Pershing Square Capital Management   Sears   Target   Walmart   William Ackman  

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Expect More, Pay Less at Target

On commercials, Target (TGT) promises its customers: "This is a brand new day." With the stock down 58% since July 2007, the retailer's shares may eventually deliver on the same promise.

Once fueled by shoppers looking for "cheap chic," Target's sales and earnings have fallen victim to the recession, causing heartache for fans of the stock including hedge-fund manager William Ackman, whose Pershing Square Capital Management suffered losses betting on the stock in 2007 and 2008.

Though it's the nation's largest discount retailer behind Wal-Mart Stores (WMT), Target isn't viewed by shoppers these days as the place to go for the cheapest prices. Wal-Mart, by contrast, has been a solid performer in this recession: Its stock has bested most retailers over the past year. But with multiples bouncing off five-year lows, Target offers a compelling opportunity for patient investors with a long horizon.

"Rarely do you see a best-of-breed retailer with a brand and operations like Target's at this kind of a value," says Robert Drbul, an analyst with Barclays Capital. "Their weakness is entirely due to the economy. They are taking steps to mitigate the downside of the recession. So at these levels, the stock looks attractive." At $29.46, the share price already reflects a bleak year ahead. And if falling profits start climbing again in 2010, as expected, Target's share price should climb nicely in the next few years.

Even Ackman seems willing to bet on the stock's long-term prospects, despite the embarrassing performance of Pershing Square IV, a hedge fund that invested solely in Target, mostly using stock options to wager that the share price would rise. According to a recent regulatory filing, Pershing Square has a 9.7% stake in Target, and Pershing Square IV's portfolio was recently restructured using longer-dated options that expire in January 2011.

Ackman declined to comment for this story, but assured investors in a recent letter that "We will ultimately be successful in our investment in Target." Since the first store opened in 1962, Target has grown into a chain of 1,681 stores that control 1.9% of U.S. retail and food sales.That's a far cry from the 7% controlled by Wal-Mart.

But under former Chief Executive Bob Ulrich, Target reinvented the discount store. Employing "upscale discounting," Target became a purveyor of well designed, trendy merchandise. And with its slogan "Expect More. Spend Less," it lured more affluent shoppers, and grew profits fast. But changing shopping habits have hurt Target, which gets 40% of its sales from clothes and home décor.

Now, consumers are buying basics and bargain hunting. But the perception that Wal-Mart has cheaper prices is inaccurate, says Mark Cohen, a retail expert and marketing professor at Columbia Business School.

"Wal-Mart has always marketed aggressively that it's the lowest price in town, while Target has just started focusing on cheap prices," Cohen says. "But in market-basket comparison, the two retailers are competitive." Target's credit-card portfolio continues to suffer amid rising delinquencies and net charge-offs.

The result i that the Street expects a 14% drop in profits generated during the fiscal year that ended on Jan. 31, and sees another 11% decline this year to $2.56 a share. Target has shifted its advertising to emphasize value, enlarged its food section and tightened the availability of credit. It's opening fewer new stores, and recently announced job cuts. Late last year, the company suspended stock buybacks.

And under pressure from Ackman, the company sold half of its credit-card receivables to JPMorgan last year for $3.6 billion. Target, however, rejected a proposal to free up cash by placing the land under its stores into a spinoff real-estate investment trust that would then lease it back to the retailer.

"It was the right decision," says Cohen, the former chief executive of Sears Canada, arguing that adding to operating expenses "without knowing if they are going to face one, two or three years of operating difficulties is crazy." Analysts expect operating profits to rise 19% to $3.06 a share in the fiscal year that ends on Jan. 31, 2011. The stock, meanwhile, has fallen into the bargain bin.

At 12 times forward earnings, the stock trades in line with the Standard & Poor's 500, well below a historic average of 17 times forward earnings. And Chris Armbruster, a senior analyst at Al Frank Asset Management, recommends buying Target at its current price. He predicts the stock could hit $48 a share in three to five years. At that price, the stock would be trading at 13.7 times the $3.50 a share Target should earn in three years.

"The fundamentals won't look terribly positive for a while, but if you are buying with a long-term horizon, the value will bear out over time," Armbruster adds. Of course, like other retailers Target faces serious headwinds, and the stock could fall even more -- at least in the near term.

No one knows for sure when the economy will rebound. Consumers may cut back on purchases for longer than most people expect now, as they see the growing ranks of the recently unemployed. Bad credit-card loans remain a burden. But the old adage says that patience is a virtue. And at these multiples, investors willing to wait may find Target a well-tailored fit.

Source.

Filed under  //   Al Frank Asset Management   Barclays Capital   Cheap Chic   Chris Armbruster   Expect More. Spend Less.   JPMorgan Chase   Mark Cohen   Pershing Square Capital Management   Pershing Square IV   Robert Drbul   Sears Canada   Target   Walmart   William Ackman  

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The Microsoft Store?

Microsoft plans to open retail stores to peddle its wares in competition with Apple’s hip outlets. But the software giant’s focus on software, rather than cool gadgets like the iPhone, will make it difficult to generate the same level of buzz.

It’s easy to see why Microsoft wants to follow Apple’s foray into retail. Apple’s roughly 250 outlets brought in hefty average revenues of $30m per store last year. And they’re great advertising. Many Apple stores, like its flagship outlet on New York’s Fifth Avenue, have become tourist destinations.

Microsoft does produce the popular X-Box video game console and the struggling Zune music player. But these are sideshows to the company’s software business. Unfortunately, software is just less sexy than hardware – and Microsoft’s offerings are hardly exciting enough to draw in gawkers and computer nerds, the way Apple’s stores do. Also, most sales of Microsoft’s flagship operating system come pre-installed in computers. Selling PCs from manufacturers like Dell or Hewlett-Packard could hurt sales at the retail chains it currently depends on, like Best Buy.

Meanwhile, there are indications that the company’s grasp of “cool” is somewhat tenuous. It hired 25-year Wal-Mart veteran David Porter to head the retail venture. Apple’s retail boss, Ron Johnson, had been with Wal-Mart’s hipper competitor, Target.

Microsoft’s stores could aim for a different demographic than Apple and become a magnet for PC buyers. That would position it well for the much anticipated launch of Windows 7, its forthcoming operating system. But to succeed like Apple, the company will have to work hard to overturn its image as a dull monopoly.

Source.

Filed under  //   Apple Stores   David Porter   Dell   Hewlett-Packard   Microsoft   Ron Johnson   Target   Walmart   X-Box  

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Ackman on the Defensive

William Ackman, the hedge-fund manager known for criticizing insurers and other companies over their performance, scrambled over the weekend to ease investor ire stemming from losses of his own.

Investors smarting from a decline in Mr. Ackman's fund that bets exclusively on a resurgence of retailer Target Corp. are expected to be told about new breaks on fees and will be allowed to withdraw completely from the fund, a person familiar with the matter said. Initially, Mr. Ackman told investors last week they might be able to withdraw just 15% of their money. But he changed course and committed to personally add $25 million to the fund in order to pay clients out, the person said.

The fund in question, called Pershing Square IV, primarily uses stock options to wager that Target's share price will rise. But Target's stock hasn't cooperated, and the fund's losses were amplified through the use of options. Mr. Ackman is an activist investor who took a concentrated position in Target stock betting it had room to rise.

"It's a disaster. Down 90% is nothing to be proud of," Mr. Ackman said when reached at his office Sunday night. "We're doing everything we can to make it up to people." The fund lost 40% of its value just last month on top of a 68% decline in 2008, according to investors and fund documents. During the same 13 months, Target shares fell 38%.

Mr. Ackman, 42 years old, last month took steps to restructure the concentrated co-investment vehicle he started in mid-2007 with $2 billion. One concession was waiving its small management fee. Before the restructuring, the bigger 10% performance fee only applied if the fund made money. It has not had a profitable month since its inception.

Most investors in the Target fund, which include other hedge funds, also invest in better-performing Pershing Square funds. The plan is to tell them that until they regain losses from the Target fund, they won't have to pay the larger 20% performance fees in the other funds, a person familiar with the plan said.

Mr. Ackman's other funds lost between 11% and 13% in 2008 on performance, better than most hedge funds last year.

Source.

Filed under  //   Management Fee   Pershing Square IV   Target   William Ackman  

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Ackman Loses 68% on Target Investment

For the second straight year, activist hedge fund manager William Ackman’s bet on Target Corp. has failed to pay off. Pershing Square IV, which invests exclusively in the Minneapolis-based retailer, with two-times leverage to boot, lost 68% last year. Target stock, which lost 31% on the year, was not buoyed by any Christmas optimism, sending Pershing Square IV down a further 7.7%.

The fund lost 43% in 2007. Ackman’s New York-based firm, Pershing Square Capital Management, controls 9.5% of Target. The well-known activist has been pushing Target to spin its real-estate holdings into a separate real-estate investment trust. Target has thus far balked at giving up control of the land under its stores, but Ackman has succeeded in campaigns to get the retailer to buy back shares and sell half of its credit-card portfolio. Source.

Target announced a $10 billion share repurchase program in November 2007 and sold almost half of its credit-card portfolio to JPMorgan Chase & Co. for $3.6 billion last year. Target rose $1.51, or 4.4%, to $36.14 at 4:15 p.m. in New York Stock Exchange composite trading on January 5, 2009. Target fell 31% last year, compared with the 38% decline by the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index. Source.

Filed under  //   Hedge Funds   Target   William Ackman  

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Stocks to Invest in for a 2009 Turnaround

The Federal Reserve cut the benchmark interest rates to an extraordinary low between zero and 0.25% and promised a range of consumer and corporate lending programs to stimulate the economy. The question now is that after the government practically promised to print money to keep the economy alive is whether this desperate ploy will work.

Daniel Frascarelli, who manages large-cap core equity investments at Lord Abbett, has nudged up his exposure to credit-dependent sectors like financials and increased consumer-discretionary from underweight to equal weight. While the Fed's zero interest rate policy may eventually trigger inflation, Mr. Frascarelli thinks that credit will improve first and that will help consumer discretionary and financial. The hope is for mortgage rates to fall far enough to encourage buyers, slow the slippage of home prices, improve interest margins and get banks to lend again.

In addition to Mr. Frascarelli's holdings of quality financial stocks like Bank of New York Mellon and PNC Financial Services, he has added those that might benefit if credit and capital markets improve like Goldman Sachs and well-capitalized insurers like MetLife. He has also expanded from his clutch of recession-resistant stocks like Walmart to less defensive names like Coach and Target. Source.

Filed under  //   Bank of New York Mellon   Coach   Federal Reserve   Goldman Sachs   Goldman Sachs Group   Metlife   PNC Financial Services   Target   Walmart  

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